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Three studies on foreign aid, rent-seeking, and economic growth in
sub-Saharan Africa are presented. The first study examines the possible
simultaneity that may exist between a donor’s provision of aid and the rentseeking (corruption) activities in the recipient country. Does the amount of
aid depend on the lack of corruption in a country? Simultaneously, does the
level of corruption depend on the amount of aid and the type of donor? The
main goals of this paper are to examine whether such simultaneity exists and
whether the impact of aid depends on the type of the donor, either
multilateral or bilateral.

The second study extends the first model by incorporating an
additional equation for GDP per capita. It examines whether simultaneity
exists between the three variables: foreign aid, corruption, and GDP per
capita and whether the relationship depends upon the source of the foreign
aid. Adding GDP per capita as an endogenous variable will provide another
key to understanding the lack of long-term effectiveness for foreign aid in
sub-Saharan Africa.
The third and final study uses a fixed effects model to examine the
relationship between foreign aid and the level of corruption in sub-Saharan
Africa. Accounting for fixed effects allows me to examine whether unobserved
characteristics of recipient countries play a role in explaining the impact of
aid on corruption.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Africa, and especially sub-Saharan Africa, has been and continues to be
one of the largest targets of foreign aid. According to a recent United Nations
(2006) report, Africa has received $580 billion in aid since 1960. Eberstadt
(2000) reported that aid to Africa from 1960 to 1997 totaled nearly $400 billion
in real terms, an amount he equated to six Marshall Plans. In July 2005, the
G-8 agreed to double foreign aid to Africa from $25 billion per year to $50
billion per year, while at the same time forgiving previous debt for highly
indebted countries. The World Bank (2007) reported that, as of April 2007, its
portfolio of aid to Africa amounted to $19.2 billion. Figure 1.1 shows foreign
aid flows for 32 sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1984-2003 1.

1

The countries included in the sample are listed in Appendix A.
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Figure 1.1
Foreign Aid Flows
This outpouring of aid has produced few tangible results and African
nations remain some of the poorest and least-developed countries in the world.
In its 1989 report, the World Bank concluded that “overall, Africans are almost
as poor today as they were 30 years ago (at independence)” (World Bank, 1989;
1). In 1997, the GDP per capita for Africa, excluding South Africa, was $336
compared to $449 for South Asia, $715 for East Asia and $1890 for Latin
America. The median African nation, has more than 40 percent of the
population living on less than a dollar a day, with income averaging just $0.65
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per day (adjusted for purchasing power) (World Bank, 2001; 8-10). The average
growth rate over 1984 to 2003 period is depicted in Figure 1.2.
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Figure 1.2
Growth Rate of Per Capita GDP
So why has foreign aid failed to stimulate development and provide for
economic growth? Examining the links between foreign aid, rent-seeking and
GDP per capita in recipient governments provides one key to understanding
the lack of long-term effectiveness of foreign aid. Nearly a half-century ago,
Friedman (1958) suggested that foreign aid has failed to achieve its desired
results because it has served to strengthen the government sector of local
3

economies. This strengthening, in turn, has served to lessen the economic
pressure on government institutions to create an environment which
facilitates the development of private markets. In a similar argument
supported by their empirical results, Burnside and Dollar (2000) put the blame
on the “poor policy environment” that exists in recipient countries. According
to their study, aid promotes growth only when combined with sound fiscal,
monetary, and trade policies. As a result, they suggest a carrot and stick
approach to foreign aid allocation in which aid should be diverted to countries
with better policies. 2
Both of the theories advanced above focus on the macroeconomic policies
of the recipient country. Recent research has focused on more microeconomic
issues; specifically, the micro-motives of the recipient government through
which the foreign aid is disbursed. In these models foreign aid may not
stimulate development because it is diverted to non-productive rent-seeking
activities or more simply, corruption. 3 According to Bauer (1991), since aid
dollars are funneled through the recipient government and then into the local
economy, government officials have incentives to use the funds for

The empirical results of Burnside and Dollar have been criticized for lack of robustness and
for being data dependent. See Easterly et al, (2004), Harms and Lutz (2004), and Rajan and
Subramanian, (2005).
2

See for example, Svensson (1998, 2000), Alesina And Weder (1999), Economides, et.al.,
(2004), and Kasper (2006).

3
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economically non-productive activities such as increasing patronage, prestige
and power.
In Chapters IV and V, I empirically examine the claims of this latter
argument in explaining the failure of foreign aid; i.e., that aid is diverted to
non-productive rent-seeking activities. In Chapter IV, I examine the
relationship between rent-seeking or corruption and foreign aid. 4 Chapter V
expands the first model by incorporating an additional equation for GDP per
capita. It examines whether simultaneity exists between foreign aid,
corruption, and GDP per capita, and whether the relationships depend upon
the source of the foreign aid. Thus, adding GDP per capita as an endogenous
variable will provide another key to understanding the lack of long-term
effectiveness for foreign aid in sub-Saharan Africa.
The body of this dissertation is organized as follows. In chapter II, I
present a review of the pertinent economic literature. I begin that section by
considering the alternative views regarding corruption and economic growth.
In chapter III the data and estimation method is explained. In chapter IV, I
turn to the question of the supposed linkages between foreign aid and rentseeking activity. In chapter V, I examine whether simultaneity exists between
foreign aid, corruption, and GDP per capita, and whether the relationship
depends upon the source of the foreign aid. This will explain the effect of
Throughout the remaining portion of the paper, the terms “rent-seeking activities” and
“corruption” will be used interchangeably.

4
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bilateral and multilateral foreign aid on economic growth. In chapter VI, I add
country specific dummies to control for differences between countries. The use
of this fixed effects model helps me to explain whether the differences between
individual countries play a role in explaining the relationship between foreign
aid and corruption. Concluding comments and policy implications are found in
Chapter VII.
Before proceeding, I provide a brief description of the history and
institutions involved in the distribution of foreign aid.
Brief History of Foreign Aid
Although development assistance existed prior to World War II, the
structure of modern day assistance arises from two post-war institutions; the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank). These institutions were
formed to help rebuild post-war Europe; however, their success, and that of the
European Recovery Program (later known as the Marshall Plan) led President
Truman to propose an increase in the role of the United States in providing
foreign aid elsewhere in the world. In his inaugural address, January 20, 1949:
“We must embark on a bold new program for
making the benefits of our scientific advances and
industrial progress available for the improvement
and growth of underdeveloped areas…what we
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envisage is a program of development based on the
concept of democratic fair dealing” 5
With Truman’s speech, the United States committed itself to providing
assistance not only to Europe, but also to other developing countries including
those in Africa. Development began to be treated as an economic phenomenon
that required aid in the form of “scientific advances and industrial progress” to
create increased economic growth. The notion of development has evolved to
include foreign aid in additional areas such as famine and debt relief.6
Types of Foreign Aid
Foreign aid can be broadly divided into two types: bilateral and
multilateral aid. Bilateral aid is given by the government of one country to
another directly through an aid agency, such as the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), Britain’s Department for International
Development (DFID), the International Development Agencies of Canada
(CIDA), or the Sweden International Development Agency (SIDA).
Multilateral aid is given to a particular country through international agencies
19 Inaugural address: President Harry Truman, retrieved from Harry Truman Library and
Museum located at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/viewpapers.php?pid=1030 on
September 12, 2007.

5

The exact meaning of “development” is debatable. Schumpeter defines development as ‘‘such
changes in economic life as are not forced upon it from without but arise by its own initiative,
from within’’ (Prendergast, 2005; 4 ). In other words, development arises from innovation
within a country. According to Todaro and Smith (2006; 17) “Development is a
multidimensional process involving major changes in social structures, popular attitudes, and
national institutions, as well as the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of
inequality and the eradication of poverty”. In this case, development implies more, and needs
the participation not only of the country involved but also outside participation.
6
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such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), regional
development banks (e.g., the African Development Bank) or the United
Nations.
This paper argues that there may be a significant difference between
multilateral aid and bilateral aid with regard to its impact on corruption.
Multilateral aid is given to a particular country through an international
agency with specific development conditions attached to the aid, while
bilateral aid typically excludes these provisions. Furthermore, the inclusion of
development conditions for multilateral aid is a relatively recent phenomenon.
However, unlike multilateral aid, the provision of bilateral aid is more closely
related to taxpayers in the donor country and therefore may be held under
greater scrutiny (Martines, 2004).
Foreign aid can also be disaggregated as project aid, program aid,
technical assistance, and food aid. Funds designated as project aid are
restricted to specific projects for specific purposes. For example, aid to build a
new healthcare facility or elementary school would be considered project aid.
Aid in this form allows donors to better monitor the use of their funds by the
recipient country. However, since budget amounts are fungible, this
monitoring is incomplete. Since designating aid for a particular project does
not necessarily mean that the recipient’s spending in that area will simply
increase by the amount of the aid, the recipient could reallocate already
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designated resources away from the project once they receive the project aid
(see for example, World Bank, 1998, Feyzioglu et.al., 1998). Fungibility of
funds is a potential problem from the donor’s point of view; however, for the
economic development researcher, calling it a “problem” implicitly assumes
that the donor’s judgment about resource allocation is better than that of the
recipient country.
While project aid is designated for a specific project, program aid is
designated for spending in a particular sector regardless of the particulars. For
example, program aid may be designated for spending on health care or
education. Technical assistance provides trained personnel from donor
countries or agencies in order to assist with a specific project or development
program. Typically this occurs when local professionals are either not qualified
or in short supply; most often this occurs in areas such as medicine, computer
technology, public health, and law. Eaton (1998) has argued that the provision
of technical assistance may not only alleviate qualified labor shortages, but
may also alleviate inefficiencies when the recipient country lacks the necessary
expertise to hire appropriate contractors themselves. Opponents of technical
assistance argue that it erodes the decision-making ability of the recipient
country and creates discontent among the local skilled workforce (Cliff, 1993).
In addition, outside technical assistance and decision-making is, in some cases,
ignorant of local customs, culture and history. To this end, some studies have
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warned that technical assistance should be delivered “in a manner which is
both complementary of, and congruent with, cultural, economic,
organizational, and technological factors in place at the local level” (Hellinger,
Hellinger, and O’Regan 1988; 42).
Food aid is usually provided as a response to a disaster or emergency
situation such as drought, famine or other natural calamities. It is usually
bilateral aid providing mostly food grains to disaster-torn areas. The United
States contributes approximately 2.5 million metric tons of food aid each year
worth over $1 billion, making the US the single largest deliverer of food aid
across the globe. The main criticism of food aid is that it depresses agricultural
and farm output in the recipient country. This idea has been argued on the
ground that, “food aid lowers food prices because it satisfies part of domestic
demand and hence reduces the incentive for domestic farmers to produce
grains and other foods” (Perkins et al. 2001; 416).

10

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

There are two contrasting perspectives regarding the effect of corruption
on economic growth and development. The first view assumes a negative
relationship between corruption and economic growth and development. 7
Corruption discourages private entrepreneurs, provides incentives for workers
to engage in nonproductive activities, hinders private foreign investment,
increases the size of government, and decreases the quality of existing
infrastructure.
Rather than hindering growth and development, the second view
concludes that corruption may actually promote economic growth.8 When
corruption results in fewer bureaucratic delays, it can enhance efficiency and
facilitate growth. In a system that is already distorted, this type of corruption
can be the “second-best” solution to existing bureaucratic inefficiencies. For
example, according to Leff “if the government has erred in its decision, the

See Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Mauro (1995, 1996), Keefer and Knack (1995),
Triesman (2000), Tanzi and Davoddi (1997), Gupta, et al. (1998), Elliott (1997), Wei (1997a),
Brunetti, et al. (1997), Lambsdorff (1999), Rose-Ackerman (1997) and Bardhan (1997).
7

8

See Leff (1964), Huntington (1968)
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course made possible by corruption may well be the better one” (Leff, 1964; 11).
In other words, if a government makes poor policy decisions in the absence of
corruption, it may be the case that corrupt decisions are actually superior
because they limit the government’s ability to implement poor decisions. The
possibility of engaging in corrupt activities may also provide an incentive for
bureaucrats to be productive. Lui (1985) provides a model which illustrates
that bribery can enhance efficiency by reducing bureaucratic delay.
In Chapter V, I further explore this debate by examining whether the
source of aid has different effects on corruption and GDP per capita. For
example, does bilateral aid affect the level of corruption, and GDP per capita
differently from multilateral aid?
The effect of foreign aid on developing countries remains one of the most
controversial topics in development economics. No consensus on the
effectiveness of aid on growth and development has been reached. Lack of
economic growth in recipient countries, government corruption, and numerous
policy failures have been frequently used to criticize foreign aid as ineffective.
Foreign aid has been criticized for many years as being detrimental for
development. Friedman (1958) suggested that foreign aid has failed to achieve
its desired results because it has served to strengthen the government sector of
local economies. This strengthening, in turn, has served to lessen the economic
pressure on government institutions to create an environment which
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facilitates the development of private markets. Other authors have also
arrived at similar conclusions regarding the impact of foreign aid, and argue
that foreign aid simply increases current consumption rather than promoting
long-term economic growth. Eaton states that “foreign capital can reduce
welfare by exacerbating an existing domestic distortion” (Eaton, 1998; 1324).
According to Griffin (1978), foreign aid decreases savings, increases
consumption, increases the capital-output ratio, and thus results in negative
economic growth. Rather than addressing the underlying hindrances to
economic growth, foreign aid ultimately results in furthering these underlying
problems.
Conversely, others, such as Rosentein-Rodan (1961) and Cheney and
Strout (1966), argue that there is a positive relationship between foreign aid
and economic growth. According to Cheney and Strout, foreign aid fills the gap
in savings to match investment opportunities, and foreign aid fills the gap in
foreign exchange earnings (export earnings) to finance imports of capital that
are important to ensuring growth in developing countries. Chenery and Carter
arrive at a similar conclusion. They state: “In general, the countries that have
raised their savings rates as a result of the aid-supported growth processes
greatly outweigh the cases in which an unnecessary diversion to consumption
[occurs]” (Chenery and Carter, 1973; 468). This “two-gap” model and its
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supporters, however, do not account for the most important factor regarding
foreign aid ― the behavior of recipient governments.
The debate regarding the relationship between foreign aid and the
government activities of the recipient country received attention after Heller
(1975) estimated the effect of foreign aid on government fiscal responses.
Using a cross-section time series econometric model of the public sector for
eleven African countries (Nigeria, Ghana, Zambia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania,
Malawi, Liberia, Ethiopia, Tunisia, and Morocco), Heller suggested that “aid
not only increases investment, but simultaneously facilitates a reduction in the
level of domestic taxes and borrowing” (p.429). Since then, many researchers
(Mosely et al., 1987; Gang and Khan, 1991; Gupta, 1997; Franco-Rodriguez et
al., 1998; McGillivray, 2000; Franco-Rodriguez, 2000, and Mavrotas and
Ouattara, 2006) have analyzed the effect of aid on the fiscal behavior of the
recipient country and argued that the recipient country’s fiscal policies can
influence the effectiveness of aid. For instance, Burnside and Dollar (2000)
argue that aid promotes growth only when combined with sound fiscal,
monetary, and trade policies. As a result, they suggest a carrot and stick
approach to foreign aid allocation in which aid should be diverted to countries
with better policies.
Since foreign aid is given primarily to governments in developing
countries, the impact of foreign aid on a recipient economy relies heavily on
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behavior of the government officials (Franco-Rodriguez et al., 1998). This is
particularly true in Africa, where governments mobilize and manage
resources, including foreign aid transfers. Therefore, it is important to
understand what impact aid has on the government of the developing country
itself and how this relates to economic growth. One view is that foreign aid is
diverted to non productive activities and, therefore fosters corruption. The
possibility that foreign aid may foster corruption has been examined in the
recent economic development literature (Svensson, 2000; Alesina and Weder,
2002; Economides et.al., 2004).
Using a game-theoretic, rent-seeking model and employing a system of
simultaneous equations, Svensson finds that foreign aid is positively
associated with corruption and has been a source of rent in recipient countries.
Aid fosters corruption by increasing the size of resources fought over by
different ethnic and several interest groups. Corruption is more prevalent in
places where ethno-lingual fractionalization and weak political institutions are
present. 9 Therefore, an increase in foreign aid does not necessarily lead to an
increase in recipient country’s welfare. Similarly, Tornell and Lane (1999)
suggest that since foreign aid is influenced by the corrupt activities of political
Ethno-lingual fractionalization is defined as the probability that two randomly drawn
members of the population belong to different ethno-linguistic groups (Easterly and Levine,
1997; Svensson, 2000). For instance, Svensson finds that in a country where ethno-lingual
fractionalization is high, a 1 standard deviation increase in aid is associated with an increase
of 0.8 standard deviation in the corruption index.

9
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leaders and bureaucrats, it increases “their appropriation rates leading to a
dissipation of the revenues and no gain in welfare.” This point is consistent
with Pack and Pack (1993), Alesina and Weder (2002), Economides, et. al.
(2004), and Kasper (2006), who argue that in the presence of powerful groups,
foreign aid can increase corruption and thus can be counter-productive to
policy reforms in developing countries. To the question of whether corrupt
countries receive less aid, Alesina and Weder suggest that more corrupt
countries may actually receive more aid. They interpret this finding to indicate
that donors are ignoring the extent of corruption present in recipient
countries, thus making poor aid allocation decisions.
The research presented here examines the relationship between foreign
aid and corruption in Africa. Using a simultaneous equations model I examine
both whether foreign aid spreads corruption and if the level of corruption
determines the amount of foreign aid received (as in Alesina & Weder 2002).
Furthermore, I examine if the results depend on whether the inflow of aid
comes from bilateral or multilateral organizations.
A Principal-Agent Model of Foreign Aid and Corruption
Since the bulk of foreign aid flows through the recipient government,
the impact of foreign aid on a recipient economy relies heavily on behavior of
the government officials (Franco-Rodriguez et al., 1998). This behavior can, to
some extent, be influenced by the donor agency which may impose conditions
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of behavior in the foreign aid contract. This contracting relationship can be
examined by applying a principal-agent model to the donor-recipient
relationship.
Following Svensson (2003) I model a foreign aid donor with an
exogenously determined aid budget, B, which can be transferred to the
recipient country’s government. The donor derives utility from the
“performance” of the recipient’s economy. This performance can be measured
along several possible dimensions including poverty, literacy, infant mortality,
or democracy. Performance is determined by reforms instituted at the behest
of the donor country. Since aid dollars can be used for productive activities or
skimmed off for non-productive activities, I assume that the level of
performance is related both to the level of aid as well as the level of corruption
in the recipient government. The level of corruption is influenced by the
success of reforms in the recipient country. Reforms require costly effort by the
recipient government. However, due to institutional conditions and the extent
of corruption apparatus in the recipient country, government efforts at reform
may not be successful.
Let Ω∈{success, failure} represent the outcome of the reform effort. The
value of the performance measure, M, depends upon whether reform is a
success or a failure and upon the level of aid, α ≤ B , provided by the donor.
Specifically, I assume that

17

M = (1 − r (Ω))h(α )
where r (Ω) is the level of rent-seeking activity or corruption dependent upon
the result of reform effort; also, h′ > 0 and h′′ < 0 . I also assume that

(1 − r ( success ))h(α ) > (1 − r ( failure))h(α ) ∀α
and

r ( success ) = 0 ; r ( failure) ≤ 1 .
The recipient country chooses reform effort, e ∈ {e, e} where e refers to

high effort and e indicates low effort by the recipient. The probability of
successful reform, e, is given by q(e) , where q(e) > q(e) . While the donor cannot
observe the degree of success of the reforms directly, it can observe a signal, σ ,
which is correlated with the reform outcome. Let σ ∈ {σ , σ } where σ refers to a
signal of high reform effort and σ refers to a signal of low reform effort. I
assume that
z (σ | successful reform) = z (σ | unsuccessful reform) = z
z (σ | successful reform) = z (σ | unsuccessful reform) = 1 − z
1
z > q (e) >
2

where z (σ | reform outcome) is the probability of observing signal σ given the
particular reform outcome, either successful or unsuccessful. In the above
equation z is the probability of observing correctly and 1-z is the probability of
observing incorrectly. The equation z > q(e) >

1
implies that, if the recipient
2

country exerts a high level of effort for reform the odds that they will be
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successful are better than 50%. Note that z > q(e) implies that it is expected
that the observed signal is correct.
The problem for the donor is to design a contract for the provision of aid
to the recipient that will induce the highest effort at reform ( e ) despite the fact
actual effort is not observable. Specifically, the donor seeks to design an aid
contract that maximizes its welfare, WD = E[ M ] = E[(1 − r (Ω))h(α )] , where E
represents expected value. Since the donor is able to observe the signal σ
which is correlated with effort, the optimal contract will be a menu of aid
amounts, {α (σ )} , that successfully induces the recipient to exert the highest
level of reform effort. Since there are only two observable signals, σ , σ , the
contract includes only two aid provisions: α (σ ), α (σ ) .
I now turn to the utility of the decision maker in the recipient country.
Exerting effort is costly. Assume that the disutility per unit of effort is δ and
utility derived from aid is v (α ) . The welfare of the recipient country can then
be written as follows.
WR = E[v (α ) − δ e]
In order for the contract designed by the donor to work successfully, it
must satisfy two constraints 10. The first constraint is called the “individual
rationality” (IR) constraint. This constraint requires that the agent is better off

10

See Mas-Coell et.al (1995) for a discussion of the IR and IC constraint.
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accepting the aid rather than refusing it. The second constraint is called the
“incentive compatibility” (IC) constraint. This constraint requires that once the
contract is accepted, the agent is at least as well-off exerting the high level of
effort as the low level of effort. In other words, the optimal contract should
induce the desired level of effort. These two conditions appear below as
constraints in the full statement of the donor’s maximization problem:
Maximize

α (σ ), α (σ )

WD = E[(1 − r (Ω))h(α (σ )) | σ ] + E[(1 − r (Ω))h(α (σ )) | σ ]
subject to
α (σ ) ≤ B, σ ∈ {σ , σ }
v (α (σ )) [q (e ) − zq (e ) + z − zq (e )] + v(α (σ ))[ zq (e ) + (1 − z )(1 − q (e ))] ≥ δ
[2 zq (e ) − 2 zq (e) − q(e ) + q(e)][v(α (σ )) − v(α (σ ))] ≥ δ

Proposition 1: (Svensson, 2003) Provided that r (Ω) is sufficiently low, the
optimal contract is given as
α (σ ) = B

α (σ ) = v −1 (θ ) where θ = v ( B ) −

δ
[(2 z − 1)( q( e ) − q( e ))]

Only the incentive compatibility constraint binds and e is chosen. 11
Proposition 1 says that when the donor observes the high signal ( σ ), the
optimal contract is to provide the total aid budget, B. However if the donor
observes the low signal ( σ ) the optimal amount is as defined in the second
equation under Proposition 1, which is lower than the total budget, B. Thus,
the optimal amount is contingent upon whether the donor observes the lower

11

For a proof of this conclusion see Appendix B
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( IR)
( IC )

or higher signal. The recipient knows that to be able to receive the full amount,
B, it should put forward its best effort. However, even if the recipient puts
forth high effort, the donor could still see the low signal, which will result in a
lower level of aid.
For the purposes of this paper, the above model predicts that if a donor
makes aid contingent upon some signal related to reform effort then the
provision of aid will induce reform efforts and reduce rent-seeking activities.
Thus, the model predicts that reform effort is influenced by the amount of
foreign aid and that the amount of aid is simultaneously determined by reform
efforts. In a later section I provide empirical tests of these hypotheses.
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CHAPTER III
DESCRIPTION OF DATA
In this section I describe the data used to test hypotheses regarding
foreign aid, corruption, and economic growth. The variables and their
definitions used in the empirical analyses are described in Table 1.
Table 1
Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
Variables
BIL
MUL
TAID
LBIL

Definition
Bilateral aid: official development assistance disbursed to
a country by a country that is part of the Development
Assistance Committee (millions of US 2000 dollars)
Multilateral aid: aid distributed by an international
organization such as the World Bank or the International
Monetary Fund (millions of US 2000 dollars)
Total aid: the sum of BIL and MUL; total aid to a country
(current loan repayments are subtracted and military
assistance is excluded, millions of US 2000 dollars)
Natural log of BIL

LMUL

Natural log of MUL

LTAID

Natural log of TAID

COR
LGDPC

Corruption Index: an index from 0 to 6 where 0 indicates
the least corrupt and 6 represents the most corrupt.
Natural log of gross domestic product per capita, where
GDP is measured in millions of US 2000 dollars
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Descriptive Statistics
Mean=298.8178
SD=297.0070
Mean=171.6593
SD=166.0526
Mean=470.4771
SD=416.9437
Mean=5.6998**
SD =1.1116
Mean =4.6250**
SD = 1.2334
Mean =5.7875**
SD = 0.9931
Mean =3.4277
SD = 1.1228
Mean=6.0519**
SD=1.1755

Table 1 (Continued)
LPOP
INF
SURPNEG1

SURPNEG2

SURPNEG3

SURPNEG4

SURPNEG5
LTDEBT
ILLITERACY
ETHT
OP
ARMS
DEM

Natural log of total population
Annual inflation as measured by the consumer price index
(%)
First deficit quintile: a binary variable equaling one for a
country in a particular year that runs a deficit and that
deficit is in the lowest 20% of all deficits run by African
countries in that year, equals zero otherwise.
Second deficit quintile: a binary variable equaling one for
a country in a particular year that runs a deficit and that
deficit is in the second lowest 20% of all deficits run by
African countries in that year, equals zero otherwise
Third deficit quintile: a binary variable equaling one for a
country in a particular year that runs a deficit and that
deficit is in the third lowest 20% of all deficits run by
African countries in that year, equals zero otherwise
Fourth deficit quintile: a binary variable equaling one for
a country in a particular year that runs a deficit and that
deficit is in the fourth lowest 20% of all deficits run by
African countries in that year, equals zero otherwise
Fifth deficit quintile: a binary variable equaling one for a
country in a particular year that runs a deficit and that
deficit is in the largest 20% of all deficits run by African
countries in that year, equals zero otherwise
Natural log of total external debt, where total debt is
measured in millions of US 2000 dollars
The percentage of people ages 15 and above who cannot,
with understanding, read and write a short, simple
statement on their everyday life.
Ethnic Tension Index: an index from 0 to 6 where 0
indicates minimal tension and 6 represents countries
where tensions are high
Openness: the sum of exports and imports of goods and
services as a share of gross domestic product (%)
Arms transfer: a binary variable that equals one if a
country received transfer of conventional weapons in a
given year. Equals zero otherwise
Democracy Index: an index from 1 to 7 where 1 indicates
less freedom and 7 indicates more freedom

Mean=16.0073**
SD=1.1870
Mean=97.3515
SD=1036.61
Mean 0.1578*
SD= 0.3648
Mean=0.1609*
SD=0.3677
Mean=0.1593 *
SD=0.3663
Mean=0.1578*
SD=0.3648
Mean=0.1593*
SD=0.3663
Mean=22.0669**
SD=1.1522
Mean=46.4162
SD=20.9831
Mean=3.0192
SD=1.1555
Mean=64.9123
SD=31.3111
Mean=0.2707*
SD=0.4446
Mean=3.0559
SD=1.4416

*Means of binary variables indicate the percentage of the observations in that category
**The means of the natural log variables are the means of the logged observations and
not the log of the mean value of the underlying variable.
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The data was compiled from the World Bank Africa database, the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Index, the United Nations Statistics
Division-National Accounts, the United Nations Population Division, World
Population Prospects, and the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI).
The World Bank Africa database provides original data for net official
development assistance (ODA) from multilateral and bilateral donors. ODA is
defined as all transfers (grants and loans) from official sources that include
foreign aid targeted to improve human welfare. The data covers the time
period 1960-2003. The data on debt (LTDEBT), adult illiteracy (ILLITERACY),
deficit, SURPNEG and inflation, INF are also obtained from the World Bank
Africa database (2005).
The data on total debt is used to explore whether highly indebted
countries receive more or less bilateral aid. To this end, the total external debt
variable is used as a proxy for the likelihood of debt repayment. My conjecture
is that, while multilateral aid organizations are interested in debt repayment,
their decisions are not based on the likelihood of repayment. Instead,
multilateral organizations such as the World Bank orientate their aid
decisions around identifying effective development projects; effective
development is the central concern for multilateral aid organizations. To this
end, Kindleberger argues that multilateral aid is less driven by political
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interest or donor’s self interest and therefore can increase economic
development (Kindleberger, 1970; 141). In contrast, bilateral donors such as
the US are politically more directly accountable to taxpayers than are
multilateral aid organizations. Thus, bilateral donors pay attention to the
likelihood of debt repayment when making aid decisions. In short, bilateral
donors face greater political scrutiny for aid decisions than do multilateral
donors, causing bilateral donors to consider the likelihood of debt repayment
when making aid decisions. The standard deviation of 1.15 indicates that the
debt observations are fairly closely clustered around the mean of 22.07. As the
final dataset spans 1984 through 2003, it is interesting to note that subSaharan debt has remained clustered around this mark throughout these two
decades.
Along with the inflation variable, which measures soundness of
monetary policy, I created five dummy variables (SURPNEG1through
SURPNEG5) representing the spectrum of government deficits for the period
1984-2003. All observations for each country were sorted in each year
according to their budget balance. The countries running a deficit were broken
into quintiles with the first quintile representing those countries with the least
deficit and the fifth quintile representing those countries with the greatest
deficits. The variable SURPNEG1 is coded as 1 if the country’s annual deficit
fell within the first quintile or the least deficit, and 0 otherwise; SURPNEG2 is
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likewise a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country’s annual deficit fell within
the second quintile; SURPNEG3 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
country’s annual deficit fell within the third quintile; SURPNEG4 is likewise a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the country’s annual deficit fell within the fourth;
the variable SURPNEG5 is coded as 1 if the country’s annual deficit fell within
the fifth quintile or the largest deficit, and 0 otherwise. These variables are
used first, to explore whether multilateral aid allocations favor sound fiscal
and monetary policy and second, to examine the relationship between different
degrees of deficit and GDP per capita. Burnside and Dollar (2000) also used
fiscal surplus/deficit and inflation variables to explore whether good policy
plays a role in allocating foreign aid. There is great variation in inflation rates
in this dataset; the mean rate is 97.35%, while the standard deviation is
1,036.61%.
To measure rent-seeking, I use an index of corruption from the ICRG,
which is part of the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group. The data set is a
survey-based indicator that offers information for foreign investors on political
risk 12. In short, it provides an assessment of the degree of corruption in a
country to foreign investors and lenders. The index considers corruption to be
“high government officials’ demand for special payments and bribes connected

12 All the information on ICRG data is obtained from the PRS Group of Syracuse, NY, a group
that provides information primarily to overseas investors. For detail visit
http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx

26

with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police
protection or loans.” 13 One of the main problems of this assessment is that
corruption is hard to quantify due to its illegal and hidden nature (Coolidge
and Rose-Ackerman, 1997), and moreover, what is perceived as corruption in
one country is considered normal in another country (Lindgreen, 2004).
Therefore, the ICRG and other corruption measures are subjective in nature,
and analysis based on this assessment should be interpreted as only
suggestive rather than comprehensive 14. However, ICRG is the only data
source that offers annual data covering most of the sub-Saharan countries
from 1984 to 2006. This dataset has been used frequently by many researchers
including Svensson (2000) and Alesia and Weder (2002). The original index,
which ranged from 0 representing high corruption to 6 showing low corruption,
has been rescaled so that higher values of the re-scaled index represent the
more corrupt countries. The re-scaled variable is denoted by COR. A notable
observation from summary statistics in Table 1 is the relatively high average
of the corruption index of 3.43, when compared to Asia’s 2.77 (Samia, 2007)
suggests that African countries used in this analysis are perceived to be highly
corrupt.
13 See The PRS Group website for detail located at
http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx

“The political risk assessments including corruption are made on the basis of subjective
analysis of the available information” statement is quoted from The PRS Group website
located at http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx. See also Sadholtz and Koetzle
(2000).
14
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The ICRG was also used to obtain an index of ethnic tension. This index
includes “an assessment of the degree of tension within a country attributable
to racial, nationality, or language divisions.” 15 The index ranges from 0
indicating high racial, nationality or language divisions to 6 indicating such
tensions are minimal. I reverse the scale so that 0 indicates minimal tension
and 6 indicates the highest tension. This re-scaled variable is denoted by
ETHT. The mean score on this index is 3.02, which is roughly the midpoint on
the scale. I also use data on adult illiteracy to explore the effect of an educated
work force on the economic growth of recipient countries.
Data on democracy was obtained from Freedom House who computes
what is known as the Gastil Index for the period 1975-2004. Freedom House
provide an expert assessment of civil and political rights in a country based on
information about political pluralism and participation, freedom of expression
and belief, openness and accountability of government, rule of law, and
personal autonomy and individual rights. 16 The index on civil and political
liberties ranges from 1-7 where 1 indicates greatest freedom and 7 indicates
the least freedom. I reverse the scale so that higher values indicate greater
freedom rather than less, denoting the rescaled variable by DEM. This dataset
is commonly used; for example, see Ades and Di Tella (1999), Sandholtz and
15

The PRS Group website located at http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx P. 33

16

Source: Freedom in the World (2004); http://www.freedomhouse.org.
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Koetzle (2000), and Fisman and Gatti (2002). The average of 3.06 for the
democracy index indicates low levels of civil and political freedom in subSaharan Africa.
Data on GDP and openness for the years 1970 to 2003 were obtained
from the World Bank Africa database. Openness (OP) is a measure of how
much a recipient country participates in international trade. It is defined as
the ratio of a recipient country’s exports and imports to its GDP. The data on
population was taken from the United Nations Statistics Division-National
Accounts and the UN Population Division, World Population Prospects. There
is significant variation in the openness observed in this dataset; the standard
deviation of OP is 31.31, while the mean is 64.91.
Finally, data on transfers of major conventional weapons (ARMS) was
obtained from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). I
created the dummy variable ARMS, indicating whether a country received
transfers of conventional weapons in a given year, to use as a proxy for donor
interest. It has been shown that aid is given based not only on recipient needs,
but also on donors’ strategic interest; for example, see Svensson (2000), Boone
(1996), Burnside and Dollar (2000), and World Bank (1998). Arms transfers
occurred in only 27% of the observations in the dataset.
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CHAPTER IV
FOREIGN AID AND CORRUPTION
Introduction
Using annual data from sub-Saharan African countries covering 19842003, I address three main questions regarding the relationship between rentseeking or corruption and foreign aid. Specifically, I examine whether the
empirical data supports the supposition that recipient governments divert
foreign aid to non-productive rent-seeking activities. Simultaneously, I
examine whether the level of corruption has an impact on the amount of aid
received. Finally, I examine whether the source of foreign aid, bilateral or
multilateral, has an impact on the diversion of aid toward rent-seeking
activities. This final question allows me to address whether multilateral aid
agencies affect the allocation and diversion of aid differently than bilateral aid
agencies. The answers to these questions will help determine whether the
rent-seeking theory of the failure of foreign aid has empirical support with
respect to sub-Saharan Africa. Results will illuminate policy decisions with
regard to foreign aid allocation.
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Model 1: Total Aid and Corruption
The possibility that foreign aid may foster corruption has been
examined in the recent economic development literature (Svensson, 2000).
Conversely, Alesina and Weder (2002) indicate that more corrupt countries
may actually receive more aid. These simultaneous lines of research suggest
that the cause-and-effect relationship, if any, between foreign aid and
corruption is not unidirectional. In other words, there is a two way influence
between foreign aid and corruption; foreign aid seems to affect corruption and
is, in turn, affected by it. To test the hypothesis that foreign aid is a function of
corruption and simultaneously, corruption is a function of foreign aid, I
estimate two simultaneous equations – one for foreign aid and one for
corruption.
The explanatory variables in the aid equation include real GDP per
capita (GDPC), population (LPOP), government fiscal and monetary variables
(SURPNEG1-SURPNEG5 and INF), democracy (DEM), arms transfer (ARMS),
and total external debt (LTDEBT). Following Svensson (2000) and Burnside
and Dollar (2000), I include the variables on GDP per capita and population to
explain whether the recipient’s income and population play a significant role
in the allocation of aid. Following Burnside and Dollar (2000), fiscal and
monetary policy variables are included to explain whether aid is given in
response to sound fiscal and monetary policy. The democracy variable is
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included as a proxy for whether the political environment has any significant
effect on the provision of aid, and the variable on arms transfer is included to
capture whether donors strategic interests play a significant role in the
allocation of foreign aid. Finally, as explained in Chapter III, the variable on
total external debt is included to explain whether highly indebted countries
receive more or less aid.
The explanatory variables in the corruption equation include real GDP
per capita (GDPC), openness (OP), ethnic tension (ETHT), and democracy
(DEM). Following Braun and Di Tella (2004) I include the GDPC variable to
explain whether income plays a significant role in explaining corruption.
Following Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000), the openness variable is included to
explain whether the recipient country’s increased involvement with the outside
world plays a significant role in determining corruption. As suggested by
Svensson (2000), the ethnic tension variable was included to determine
whether ethnic fractionalization plays a significant role in determining
corruption. Finally, the democracy variable was included to determine whether
an increase in the level of democracy has any significant effect on the level of
corruption in the recipient country.
To begin, I examine the relationship between total foreign aid and
corruption. This model is represented by the system of equations, [M1]:
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LTAID = α 0 + α 1COR + α 2 LGDPC + α 3 LPOP + α 4 SURPNEG1 + α 5 SURPNEG 2 +

α 6 SURPNEG3 + α 7 SURPNEG 4 + α 8 SURPNEG5 + α 9 INF + α 10 DEM +
α 11 ARMS + α 12 LTDEBT + ε α
COR = β 0 + β1 LTAID + β 2 LGDPC + β 3 OP + β 4 ETHT + β 5 DEM + ε β

[M1.1]
[M1.2]

Following Hill, Griffiths and Judge (1997), [M1] can be estimated by first
estimating the parameters of the reduced form equations using ordinary least
squares (OLS) and obtaining the predicted values for both the aid ( LTAID ) and
the corruption ( COR . ) variables.
The second stage of the process uses these predicted values and involves
estimating the following system of equations:
LTAID = α 0 + α 1 COR + α 2 LGDPC + α 3 LPOP + α 4 SURPNEG1 + α 5 SURPNEG 2 +

α 6 SURPNEG3 + α 7 SURPNEG 4 + α 8 SURPNEG5 + α 9 INF + α 10 DEM +
α 11 ARMS + α 12 LTDEBT + V A
COR = β 0 + β 1 LTAID + β 2 LGDPC + β 3 OP + β 4 ETHT + β 5 DEM + V B

[M1.3]
[M1.4]

where both [M1.3] and [M1.4] are estimated using ordinary least squares
(OLS). The estimation results of this system of equations are provided in Table
2 17, 18.

The interpretation methods for all of the variables included in this model and the models
that follow are found in Appendix D.
17

18

Results of the “first-stage” regressions are presented in Table 10 Appendix E
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Table 2
Second Stage Regression Results Examining the Simultaneity Between Total
Foreign Aid and Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa
Coefficient
Intercept
COR
LTAID
LGDPC
LPOP
SURPNEG1
SURPNEG2
SURPNEG3
SURPNEG4
SURPNEG5
INF

Dependent Variable
LTAID
COR
-0.14003
4.973008*
(0.998585)
(0.666358)
0.354925**
(0.193063)
-0.17573*
(0.078080)
-0.17555*
-0.09142**
(0.062476)
(0.053431)
0.222808*
(0.060547)
-0.08790
(0.143608)
0.562577*
(0.158446)
0.848786*
(0.194439)
0.912445*
(0.168501)
0.733041*
(0.174002)
-0.00007**
(0.000037)
-0.00477*
(0.001600)
0.205508*
(0.036742)
-0.07922
(0.030033)

OP
ETHT
DEM
ARMS
LTDEBT

0.082636**
(0.030278)
0.106978
(0.0085686)
0.065104
(0.068184)
R2 = 0.38949, F = 27.38
R2 = 0.12388, F = 14.76
(standard errors in parenthesis)
*Statistically significant at the 95% level
** Statistically significant at the 90% level.
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Model 1: Discussion
The significance of the corruption variable (COR) in the total aid
equation and of the total aid variable (LTAID) in the corruption equation
indicates that a simultaneous relationship exists between corruption and total
aid. The positive sign on the COR coefficient in the LTAID column indicates
that more corrupt governments receive more total aid. The result indicates, for
example, a unit increase in the corruption index will lead to receiving, on
average, about 35% more in total aid. This is consistent with the results of
Alesina and Weder (2002), who also find that highly corrupt countries receive
more aid.
The negative coefficient on LTAID in the corruption equation indicates
that a higher level of foreign aid leads to lower levels of corruption. In other
words, aid seems to reduce corruption. One possibility for the result could be
that a condition for continued aid is a reduction in corruption.
Total foreign aid is negatively related to GDP per capita and positively
related to population, indicating that foreign aid is driven by both the
recipient’s need, as measured by GDP per capita, and donor’s interest, as
measured by population size. The negative and significant coefficient on
LGDPC in the aid equation indicates that a one percentage point decrease in
the recipient’s real GDP per capita raises the amount of total aid received by
about 0.18 percent, while the coefficient on population size (LPOP) indicates a
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ten percentage point increase in population size leads to an increase in the
total amount of foreign aid received by about 2.2 percent. In other words, the
result suggests that donors give aid to poorer, more populace countries.
The coefficients on the fiscal policy variables SURPNEG2 through
SURPNEG5 are significant and positively related to total foreign aid. This
indicates that, relative to countries with a surplus, countries with medium or
large deficit receive more total foreign aid. For example, compared to countries
with a surplus, ceteris paribus, countries with a deficit in the highest quintile
are expected to receive about 108% more in aid; this is indicated by the
positive coefficient on the SURPNEG5 variable. This could be explained by the
willingness of the donors to help countries in poor fiscal shape. In practice, this
result could be explained by a donor country’s push for debt relief for very poor
countries through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) Initiative, the
program which was launched by the IMF and the World Bank is based on the
assumption that a poor country’s economy is poor due to the heavy debt
burden. Thus, debt cancellation was seen as a solution for the long standing
poverty for some of the heavily indebted countries, such those in sub-Saharan
Africa. But debt cancellation has its own negative incentive in that it may lead
to more government borrowing, creating even worse fiscal policy. Finally, the
monetary policy variable INF is negatively related to total foreign aid,
indicating that foreign aid is given in favor of sound monetary policy.
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The coefficient on the debt (LTDEBT) is statistically insignificant,
indicating that the amount of debt the country has is not significant
determinant for foreign aid allocation. The coefficient on the democracy
variable is positive and highly significant, indicating that more democratic
countries receive larger amounts of aid. This result could be related to the fact
that most donor countries are democracies and give aid to other democratic
governments. The coefficient of the arms transfer variable (ARMS), which is
used to measure whether total aid is given for strategic reasons, has an
intuitive sign but is statistically insignificant. This indicates that strategic or
political reasons did not explain aid decisions in sub-Saharan Africa over the
sample period.
The results for the corruption equation show that ethnic tension is
positively related to corruption. This is in line with Svensson’s finding that a
high degree of ethnic fractionalization is associated with higher corruption
(Svensson, 2003). The results also show that corruption declines as countries
become more open. The negative coefficient on the openness variable suggests
that increased involvement in trade can reduce corruption by facilitating
economic competition (Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000). These results are as
expected. However, the democracy variable (DEM) in the corruption equation
is slightly negative but statistically insignificant, indicating that being a
democratic country has no significant effect on the level of corruption in the

37

recipient country; the model in the next section investigates this unexpected
result.
Model 2: Bilateral Aid and Corruption
I now refine the above results and examine whether there are any
differences between multilateral and bilateral aid with respect to their effects
on corruption. To this end, total aid is divided into its component parts –
bilateral aid and multilateral aid. In this section, I examine the relationship
between bilateral aid and corruption.
The possibility that corruption may reduce the amount of bilateral aid
received by a recipient country has been examined in the recent economic
development literature (Schudel, 2008). Schudel argues that the level of
corruption in the recipient country has a significant effect on the amount of aid
received. Schudel finds that bilateral donors allocate more aid to less corrupt
countries than more corrupt countries. By extending the research to account
for the level of corruption in the donor countries, Schudel also finds that
relatively less corrupt donors are less likely to give aid to more corrupt
countries. In this section I am interested in examining Schudel’s former claim
― whether bilateral donors discriminate against corrupt countries.
I examine the relationship between bilateral aid and corruption using
the same basic model as before. The model is represented by the system of
equations [M2]:
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LBIL = μ 0 + μ1COR + μ 2 LGDPC + μ 3 LPOP + μ 4 SURPNEG1 + μ 5 SURPNEG 2 +

μ 6 SURPNEG3 + μ 7 SURPNEG 4 + μ 8 SURPNEG5 + μ 9 INF + μ10 DEM +
μ11 ARMS + μ12 LTDEBT + ε μ
COR = θ 0 + θ 1 LBIL + θ 2 LGDPC + θ 3 OP + θ 4 ETHT + θ 56 DEM + ε θ

[M2.1]
[M2.2]

The system of equations in [M2] can be estimated by first estimating the
parameters of the reduced form equations using ordinary least squares (OLS)
and obtaining the predicted values for both the bilateral aid ( LBIL ) and the
corruption ( COR ) variables 19.
The corresponding second stage of the process uses these estimates and
involves estimating the following system of equations:
LBIL = μ 0 + μ1 COR + μ 2 LGDPC + μ 3 LPOP + μ 4 SURPNEG1 + μ 5 SURPNEG 2 +

μ 6 SURPNEG3 + μ 7 SURPNEG 4 + μ 8 SURPNEG5 + μ 9 INF + μ10 DEM +
μ11 ARMS + μ12 LTDEBT + errorA
COR = θ 0 + θ 1 LBIL + θ 2 LGDPC + θ 3 OP + θ 4 ETHT + θ 5 DEM + errorB

[M2.3]
[M2.4]

where both [M2.3] and [M2.4] are estimated using OLS. The results of this
estimation are provided in Table 3.

19

Results of the “first-stage” regressions are presented in Table 11 Appendix E
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Table 3
Second Stage Regression Results Examining the Simultaneity Between
Corruption and Bilateral Aid in sub-Saharan Africa
Coefficient
Intercept
COR
LBIL
LGDPC
LPOP
SURPNEG1
SURPNEG2
SURPNEG3
SURPNEG4
SURPNEG5
INF
OP
ETHT
DEM
ARMS
LTDEBT

Dependent Variable
LBIL
COR
-1.41117
4.811361*
(1.288550)
(0.548429)
0.583659*
(0.249124)
-0.18790*
(0.072987)
-0.04520
-0.06940
(0.080619)
(0.050619)
0.196625*
(0.078128)
-0.09877
(0.185309)
0.710291*
(0.204455)
1.075639*
(0.250899)
1.159961*
(0.217429)
1.05520*
(0.2224528)
-0.00010*
(0.000048)
-0.00500*
(0.001599)
0.210355*
(0.036783)
0.108389*
-0.07658*
(0. 039070)
(0.030019)
0.147523
(0.110567)
0.037734
(0.087983)
R2 = 0.27574, F = 16.34
R2 = 0.12672, F = 15.15

(standard errors in parenthesis)
*Statistically significant at the 95% level
** Statistically significant at the 90% level.

40

Model 2: Discussion
A simultaneous relationship exists between corruption and bilateral aid;
this is seen from the significance of the corruption variable (COR) in the
bilateral aid equation and of the bilateral aid variable (LBIL) in the corruption
equation. The positive sign on the COR coefficient in the LBIL column
indicates that more corrupt governments receive more bilateral aid. The result
indicates, for example, a unit increase in the corruption index will lead to
receiving, on average, about 58% more in bilateral aid. This is consistent with
the results of Alesina and Weder (2002), who also find that highly corrupt
countries receive more aid. The negative sign on the LBIL coefficient in the
COR column indicates that bilateral aid reduces corruption just as in the
previous model.
Taken together, the above results support the hypothesis that foreign
aid and corruption are related. More corrupt countries receive greater amounts
of bilateral aid but this aid, in turn, reduces the level of corruption. The result
of this simultaneous equations model does not support the conjecture that
foreign aid leads to greater amounts of rent-seeking activity; rather, it
supports the conjecture that corruption is an underlying condition and aid
improves the situation.
This model for bilateral aid indicates that the recipient country’s need is
not a significant determinant for bilateral aid decisions. This is indicated by
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the negative but insignificant coefficient on the LGDPC variable. However,
bilateral aid is positively related to population, confirming the result in the
first model that foreign aid increases with the size of population in the
recipient country. Compared with the coefficient estimates for the first model,
the magnitude of the coefficient on the population variable (LPOP) decreased
in size. The positive and significant coefficient on population (LPOP) in the aid
equation indicates that a ten percentage point increase in population size
raises the amount of bilateral aid received by about 1.9 percent.
Similar to the first model, which combined bilateral and multilateral
aid, the coefficients on the fiscal policy variables SURPNEG2 through
SURPNEG5 are significant and positively related to bilateral aid. This
indicates that relative to countries with a surplus, countries with a medium or
high deficit receive more bilateral aid. For example, compared to countries
with a surplus, countries with a medium deficit are expected receive 193%
more in bilateral aid, and countries with largest deficit are expected to receive
about 187% more in bilateral aid. This is indicated by the positive coefficient
on the SURPNEG3 and SURPNEG5 variables respectively. Thus, the
decisions to give both total aid and specifically bilateral aid are focused on
helping countries in poor fiscal shape; the initiative to help the highly indebted
poor countries (HIPCs) is an example of this motivation in aid decisions.
Similarly, Burnside and Dollar (2000) found no “significant tendency for total
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aid or bilateral aid to favor good policy.” In contrast to the role of fiscal policy,
donors do favor sound monetary policy. Similar to the results from Model 1,
the recipient country’s monetary policy (INF) plays a significant role,
indicating bilateral aid decisions favor sound monetary policy.
The hypothesis that bilateral aid is given for strategic reasons is not
supported by this model. This is indicated by the insignificant coefficient of the
arms transfer variable, ARMS. The coefficient on the debt variable is also
insignificant, indicating that debt is not a significant determinant for bilateral
aid decisions. The coefficient on the democracy variable continues to be
positive and highly significant, indicating that countries that are more
democratic receive more bilateral aid; for example, each unit increase in the
democracy index results in receiving, on average, about 11% more bilateral
aid.
Unlike the model combining bilateral and multilateral aid, this model
leads to a negative and significant relationship between democracy and
corruption. This model suggests that as country becomes more democratic, the
level of corruption in the recipient country decreases. This result could be
explained by the following argument: as a country becomes democratic, the
level of transparency and accountability increases along with the level of
individual civil and political rights.
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Similar to the first model, the results for the corruption equation in this
model show that ethnic tension is positively related to corruption, and
corruption declines as a country become more open. The possibility that ethnic
division may foster corruption has been examined in the recent economic
development literature (Treisman 2000, Svensson 2003, and Yehoue 2007).
Treisman argues that by slowing economic development, ethnic division may
indirectly increase the level of corruption. According to Yehoue, ethnicity
fosters corruption by acting as “a rent-extracting technology.” The rentextracting behavior is more prevalent in places where ethnic fractionalization
and weak democracy are present.
Model 3: Multilateral Aid and Corruption
In this section, I examine the relationship between multilateral aid and
corruption. The main argument in favor of multilateral aid is the fact that
multilateral aid is less dependent on the strategic or political interests of the
donor; rather, it is based on a united effort to help the developing world
(Rodrik, 1995). As Alesina and Weder (2002) point out, one should expect
multilateral donors to discriminate against corrupt countries. In this section, I
examine whether multilateral donors pay attention to corruption in the
recipient countries when allocating aid. Specifically, this model will shed some
light on the motivations for multilateral aid in sub-Saharan Africa.
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Along with Svensson (2000), I use a two system equation to examine the
relationship between multilateral aid and corruption using the same basic
model described previously. The model is represented by the systems of
equations [M3]:
LMUL = Π 0 + Π 1COR + Π 2 LGDPC + Π 3 LPOP + Π 4 SURPNEG1 + Π 5 SURPNEG 2 +
Π 6 SURPNEG3 + Π 7 SURPNEG 4 + Π 8 SURPNEG5 + Π 9 INF + Π 10 DEM +
Π 11 ARMS + Π 12 LTDEBT + ε Π

[M3.1]

COR = Ψ0 + Ψ1 LMUL + Ψ2 LGDPC + Ψ3 OP + Ψ4 ETHT + Ψ5 DEM + ε Ψ

[M3.2]

The system of equations, [M3] can be estimated by first estimating the
parameters of the reduced form equations using ordinary least squares (OLS)
and obtaining the predicted values for both the multilateral aid ( LMUL ) and
the corruption ( COR ) variables 20.
The corresponding second stage of the process uses these estimates and
involves estimating the following system of equations:
LMUL = Π 0 + Π 1 COR + Π 2 LGDPC + Π 3 LPOP + Π 4 SURPNEG1 + Π 5 SURPNEG 2 +
Π 6 SURPNEG3 + Π 7 SURPNEG 4 + Π 8 SURPNEG5 + Π 9 INF + Π 10 DEM +
Π 11 ARMS + Π 12 LTDEBT + μ A

[M3.3]

COR = Ψ0 + Ψ1 LMUL + Ψ2 LGDPC + Ψ3 OP + Ψ4 ETHT + Ψ5 DEM + μ B

[M3.4]

where both [M3.3] and [M3.4] are estimated using OLS. The results of this
estimation are provided in Table 4.

20

Results of the “first-stage” regressions are presented in Table 12 Appendix E
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Table 4
Second Stage Regression Results Examining the Simultaneity Between
Corruption and Multilateral Aid in sub-Saharan Africa
Coefficient
Intercept
COR
LMUL
LGDPC
LPOP
SURPNEG1
SURPNEG2
SURPNEG3
SURPNEG4
SURPNEG5
INF

Dependent Variable
LMUL
COR
1.091376
5.006138*
(1.109087)
(0.799717)
-0.23431
(0.214428)
-0.15541**
(0.084147)
-0.57293*
-0.15357*
(0.069390)
(0.075281)
0.334291*
(0.067247)
-0.03030
(0.159500)
0.220453
(0.175980)
0.380096**
(0.215955)
0.328958**
(0.187147)
0.162296
(0.193257)
0.000001847
(0.000042)
-0.00425**
(0.001553)
0.197390*
(0.036821)
-0.07268*
(0.030799)

OP
ETHT
DEM
ARMS
LTDEBT

0.083153*
(0.033629)
-0.014004
(0.095168)
0.087903
(0.075729)
R2 = 0.46039, F = 36.62

(standard errors in parenthesis)

R2 = 0.12062, F = 14.32

*Statistically significant at the 95% level
** Statistically significant at the 90% level.
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Model 3: Discussion
These results indicate that corruption in recipient countries is not a
significant determinant for multilateral aid allocation decisions. In other
words, these results seem to indicate that multilateral donors do not pay
attention to the level of corruption in the recipient countries. Multilateral aid
is not directed toward more (or less) corrupt countries. However, unlike the
findings by Alesina and Weder (2002), the negative sign on the LMUL
coefficient in the COR column indicates that multilateral aid reduces the level
of corruption in the recipient country 21. Thus, both bilateral aid and
multilateral aid seem to discourage corruption.
One interesting difference between the two types of aid is related to the
size of the recipient country’s economy. The results indicate that, while
recipient need is not a significant determinant for bilateral aid allocation,
countries with lower levels of GDP per capita receive greater amounts of
multilateral aid; multilateral aid seems to favor poorer countries, whereas
bilateral aid does not. Similar to the bilateral aid equation, the coefficients on
the population variable (LPOP) indicate that multilateral aid increases with
population; for example, a ten percentage point increase in population size
raises the amount of multilateral aid received by a country by about 3.3
Note that in this model multilateral aid and corruption are simultaneously determined. The
previous discussion in this chapter of the Alesina and Weder (2002) findings focuses on
whether corruption leads to increased aid. The present discussion of Model 3 focuses on a
different causal relationship, which is also discussed in Alesina and Weder (2002). Here the
relationship in question is the impact of aid on corruption.

21
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percent. The result seems to suggest that while both bilateral and multilateral
aid increase with population, multilateral aid responds to the increases in size
more than bilateral aid.
Unlike the previous research by Burnside and Dollar (2000), I find that
there is no evidence that multilateral aid favors sound fiscal policy. In fact, if
anything, I find the opposite; according to the significant coefficient on the
fiscal policy variable SURPNEG3 and SURPNEG4 in the LMUL column,
countries with high deficits receive more multilateral aid than do countries
with a surplus. The other coefficients for the fiscal policy variables,
SURPNEG1, SURPNEG2, and SURPNEG5, are statistically not significant
indicating that, overall, a recipient country’s fiscal policy is not the main
determinant for multilateral aid decisions. This could be explained by the fact
that multilateral aid is need based, and donors’ are willing to help very poor
countries regardless of their poor fiscal or monetary policy. Similarly, the
result seems to indicate that a recipient country’s monetary policy is not a
determinant for multilateral aid allocation. This is indicated by the
insignificant coefficients on the INF variable.
The results for the corruption equation show that GDP per capita is
negatively related to corruption. Contrary to the Braun and Di Tella (2004)
argument that corruption increases with income, this result indicates that
corruption decreases with an increase in the recipient country’s real GDP per
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capita. This could be due to the fact that the need for rent-seeking may fall as
individuals become more self-sufficient due to the increase in income in the
economy as a whole.
The coefficient on the openness variable (OP) indicates that the level of
corruption will fall as a country becomes more open. This result is consistent
with the results in Model 1 and Model 2. Consistent with previous research,
such as Svensson (2000), the positive and significant coefficient on the ethnic
tension variable (ETHT) indicates that corruption increases with high racial,
nationality or language divisions.
The coefficient on the debt (LTDEBT) and arms transfer (ARMS)
variables are statistically insignificant, indicating that both strategic or
political reasons and the amount of debt the county has are not significant
determinants for multilateral aid allocation.
The coefficient on the democracy variable (DEM) continues to be
positive and highly significant, indicating that countries that are more
democratic receive more multilateral aid; for example, each unit increase in
the democracy variable will result in getting , on average, about 8% more
multilateral aid. Similar to Model 2, this model also indicates that as country
becomes more democratic, the level of corruption in the recipient country
decreases. This is indicated by the negative and highly significant coefficient
on the DEM variable in the corruption equation.
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Concluding Comments
Exploring the impact of foreign aid on rent-seeking activities I find that
there are significant differences between multilateral and bilateral aid which
are obscured by combining the two types of aid into a single measure. Using a
simultaneous system of equations describing aid and corruption, I find that
while both multilateral aid and bilateral aid have a negative effect on the level
of corruption in the recipient country, more corrupt countries receive more
bilateral aid but corruption is statistically insignificant in determining the
multilateral aid allocation.
Taken together, these results indicate that neither multilateral nor
bilateral donors penalize recipient countries for corruption. This result is
consistent with Alesina and Weder (2002) who found that neither multilateral
nor bilateral aid organizations gave more aid to less corrupt countries. In fact,
my result show bilateral aid is given to more corrupt countries.
It should be noted that these results may or may not true of more recent
aid allocations, although they do describe aid decisions over the longer period
of time included in this analysis. It should also be noted that this research
concerns aid only in terms of gifts and grants ― does not account for loans.
Thus, the possible trade off between aid, as defined, and loans is ignored. Any
such relationship may affect both bilateral and multilateral economic help
provided to any specific nation.
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CHAPTER V
FOREIGN AID, CORRUPTION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Introduction
That economic development in Africa has been slow is an
understatement. In 1997, the GDP per capita for Africa, excluding South
Africa, was $336, compared to $449 for South Asia, $715 for East Asia and
$1,890 for Latin America. In the median African nation, more than 40 percent
of the population lives on less than a dollar a day, with income averaging just
$0.65 per day adjusted for purchasing power (World Bank, 2001; 8-10).
There are many reasons for this under-development including famine,
drought, social and political instability, government corruption, and structural
problems in economic and financial institutions. The developed world, acting
either out of self interest or humanitarian reasons, has sought ways to
alleviate these problems. However, the problems remain and no clear solution
is forthcoming.
In this chapter, I extend Model 1 presented in Chapter IV by
incorporating an additional equation for GDP per capita growth. Adding GDP
per capita as an endogenous variable will provide another key to
understanding the lack of long-term effectiveness for foreign aid in sub51

Saharan Africa. Svensson (2000) argues that foreign aid fails to stimulate
growth because it is diverted to corruption, and Mauro (1995) finds that
corruption reduces growth. However, using panel data analysis, Braun and Di
Tella (2004) find that recipient country GDP per capita is positively related to
corruption.
Therefore, to test for the possible simultaneity between aid, corruption,
and growth, I consider a model with three simultaneous equations – one for
foreign aid, one for corruption, and one for GDP per capita growth. In other
words, I examine whether simultaneity exists between the three variables:
foreign aid, corruption, and GDP per capita and whether the relationship
depends upon the source of the aid.
Model 4: Total Foreign Aid, Corruption, and Economic Growth
The objective in this section is to examine the simultaneity between
total foreign aid received, corruption, and GDP per capita. The GDP per capita
equation includes ethnic tension (ETHT), democracy (DEM), population
(LPOP), government fiscal and monetary variables (SURPNEG1 through
SURPNEG5 and INF), and adult illiteracy (ILLITERACY). Following Lucas
(1988), I included the adult illiteracy variable to account for the effect of an
educated work force on a country’s economy. The ethnic tension variable was
included to explain the impact of racial or language divisions on the economy.
Following Barro (1996), the democracy variable was included to explain
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whether democracy stimulates GDP per capita growth, and following Malthus
(1798), Kuznets (1960), and Cassen (1994), the population variable was
included to determine whether population is a significant determinant for
growth. Finally, fiscal and monetary policy variables were included to explain
whether the recipient country’s GDP per capita is dependent on sound fiscal
and monetary policy. The variables in the aid and corruption equations and
the motivation behind their inclusion are described in Chapter IV.
To investigate the simultaneity between the three variables, the model
uses the following system of equations, [M4]:
LTAID = Φ 0 + Φ 1COR + Φ 2 LGDPC + Φ 3 LPOP + Φ 4 SURPNEG1 + Φ 5 SURPNEG 2 +
Φ 6 SURPNEG3 + Φ 7 SURPNEG 4 + Φ 8 SURPNEG5 + Φ 9 INF + Φ 10 DEM +
Φ 11 ARMS + Φ 12 LTDEBT + ε Φ

[ M4.1]

COR = κ 0 + κ 1 LTAID + κ 2 LGDPC + κ 3 OP + κ 4 ETHT + κ 5 DEM + ε κ

[M4.2]

LGDPC = ρ 0 + ρ 1COR + ρ 2 LTAID + ρ 3 LPOP + ρ 4 SURPNEG1 + ρ 5 SURPNEG 2 +

ρ 6 SURPNEG3 + ρ 7 SURPNEG4 + ρ 8 SURPNEG5 + ρ 9 INF + ρ 10 DEM +
ρ 11 ETHT + ρ 12 ILLITERACY + ε ρ

[M4.3]

This specification allows LTAID, COR, and LGDPC to be simultaneously
determined.
Following Hill, Griffiths and Judge (1997), [M4] can be estimated by first
estimating the parameters of the reduced form equations using ordinary least
squares (OLS) and obtaining the predicted values for aid (LTAID), corruption
(COR), and GDP per capita (LGDPC). The reduced form equations express each
endogenous variable, LTAID, COR, and LGDPC, in terms of the exogenous
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variables LPOP, SURPNEG1, SURPNEG2, SURPNEG3, SURPNEG4,
SURPNEG5, INF, DEM, ARMS, LTDEBT, OP, ETHT, ILLITERACY, and the
intercept term, plus an error term. Let LTAID, COR , and LGDPC denote the
predicted values in the regression of LTAID, COR, and LGDPC on all
predetermined variables in the system 22.
The second stage of the process uses these estimates and involves
estimating the following system of equations:
LTAID = Φ 0 + Φ 1 COR + Φ 2 LGDPC + Φ 3 LPOP + Φ 4 SURPNEG1 + Φ 5 SURPNEG 2 +
Φ 6 SURPNEG3 + Φ 7 SURPNEG 4 + Φ 8 SURPNEG5 + Φ 9 INF + Φ 10 DEM +
Φ 11 ARMS + Φ 12 LTDEBT + u A

[ M4.4]

COR = κ 0 + κ 1 LTAID + κ 2 LGDPC + κ 3 OP + κ 4 ETHT + κ 5 DEM + u B

[M4.5]

LGDPC = ρ 0 + ρ 1 COR + ρ 2 LTAID + ρ 3 LPOP + ρ 4 SURPNEG1 + ρ 5 SURPNEG 2 +

ρ 6 SURPNEG3 + ρ 7 SURPNEG4 + ρ 8SURPNEG5 + ρ 9 INF + ρ 10 DEM +
ρ 11 ETHT + ρ 12 ILLITERACY + u C

where [M4.4], [M4.5], and [M4.6] are all estimated using ordinary least
squares (OLS). The results of this estimation are provided in Table 5.

22

The results of the “first-stage” regressions are presented in Table 13 Appendix E
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[M4.6]

Table 5
Second Stage Regression Results Examining the Simultaneity Between Total
Foreign Aid, Corruption, and per capita GDP in Africa
Coefficient
Intercept
COR

LTAID
2.507497*
(1.099016)
-0.04954
(0.181021)

Dependent Variable
COR
6.138126*
(1.167222)
-0.19689
(0.126861)
-0.32126*
(0.088871)

LTAID
LGDPC
LPOP
SURPNEG1
SURPNEG2
SURPNEG3
SURPNEG4
SURPNEG5
INF

-0.32821*
(0.093868)
0.078915
(0.071063)
0.021121
(0.130011)
0.339734*
(0.133206)
0.623311*
(0.169242)
0.791128*
(0.143249)
0.603581*
(0.143900)
0.000883
(0.001085)

-0.42487*
(0.094535)
-0.55796*
(0.175384)
-0.97848*
(0.172660)
-1.17334*
(0.234043)
-1.33804*
(0.263184)
-0.83529
(0.237196)
-0.00510*
(0.001596)

OP
ETHT
DEM
ARMS
LTDEBT

LGDPC
12.18974*
(0.747185)
-0.38016
(0.256612)
0.582132*
(0.213612)

0.077792*
(0.030233)
0.017945
(0.084386)
0.163791*
(0.053475)

-0.00237
(0.002444)
0.189950*
(0.041151)
-0.04099
(0.036634)

0.068974
(0.057505)
0.064895**
(0.035281)

R2=0.114548
F=12.22

-0.02322*
(0.002926)
R2=0.44004
F=23.05

ILLITERACY
R2=0.45167
F=24.16

(standard errors in parenthesis)

*Statistically significant at the 95% level
** Statistically significant at the 90% level.
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Model 4: Discussion
The results indicate that the receipt of foreign aid appears to boost GDP
per capita; for example, the positive and a highly significant coefficient on
LTAID in the GDP per capita equation indicates that a one percentage point
increase in the amount of total foreign aid received raises recipient country’s
GDP per capita by about 0.58 percent. The results also show that poorer
countries receive more aid. To this end, the negative and significant coefficient
on LGDPC in the aid equation indicates that a one percentage point decrease
in the recipient’s real GDP per capita raises the amount of total aid received by
about 0.32 percent. However, the result indicates that low corruption does not
explain total foreign aid and foreign aid does not affect corruption levels. GDP
per capita does appear to lower corruption but higher corruption does not
affect GDP per capita.
The estimated coefficients also show that population does not affect aid
allocation decisions but is associated with a decrease in GDP per capita. The
debate over whether a large population is detrimental to economic growth goes
back to Malthus (1798). For instance, Kuznets (1960) argues that an increase
in population leads to an increase in per capita output, whereas Cassen (1994)
suggests a slow growth in population is better for economic growth in
developing countries. To this end, the negative and significant coefficient on
LPOP in the GDP per capita equation indicates that a one percentage point
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increase in population size reduces the recipient country’s GDP per capita by
about 0.43 percent. This could be explained by the strain high population may
create on infrastructure such as roads, schools, and clinics. In addition, high
population can also reduce GDP per worker since the existing capital stock
must now be distributed among the increasing population.
Like the results of the model in the previous chapter, the results here
indicate that total foreign aid increases with the recipient country’s deficit.
Thus, similar to Model 1, the coefficients on the fiscal policy variables
SURPNEG2 through SURPNEG5 are significant and positively related to total
foreign aid. The result indicates that, relative to countries with a surplus,
countries with a medium or large deficit receive more total foreign aid.
However, note that the magnitudes of all the coefficients (SURPNEG2 through
SURPNEG5) in the aid equation are smaller than in model 1. For example,
compared to countries with a surplus, ceteris paribus, countries with a deficit
in the highest quintile are expected to receive about 83% more in aid, while
countries in the medium quintile are expected to receive about 87% more in
aid; this is indicated by the positive coefficients on the SURPNEG5 and
SURPNEG3 variables respectively. As indicated in the previous chapter, this
result could be explained by the willingness of the donors to help countries in
poor fiscal shape. The World Bank and the IMF efforts through the Highly
Indebted Poor countries (HIPCs) Initiative is an example of this motivation in
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aid decisions. The coefficients on the policy variable SURPNEG1 and the
monetary policy variable INF are positive but insignificant indicating that the
recipient country’s monetary policy or the existence of a small deficit is not a
significant determinant for aid allocation decisions.
The estimated coefficients also show that the recipient country’s deficit
has a large negative effect on GDP per capita. The results indicate that, in
general, countries with a deficit have a smaller GDP per capita than do
countries with a surplus. The effects of a deficit on GDP per capita vary
according to the size of the deficit. The significant negative effect of a deficit on
GDP per capita increases in the deficit spectrum except in the fifth quintile
where the magnitude becomes smaller and insignificant. The results indicate
that compared to countries with a surplus, on average, countries with a deficit
in fourth quintile, captured by SURPNEG4, are expected to have about 74%
lower GDP per capita, while countries with a deficit in the first quintile,
captured by SURPNEG1, have about 43% lower GDP per capita. Thus, it
appears that fiscal policy leading to deficits in general results in a smaller
GDP per capita, with small to moderately high deficits having a bigger
negative effect on a country’s economy than running a surplus. The negative
coefficient for inflation indicates that responsible monetary policy, resulting in
lower inflation, increases GDP per capita.
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Similar to the results of the model in the previous chapter, the results
here indicate that highly indebted countries receive more foreign aid. This
could be explained by the willingness of donors to help highly indebted
countries. The positive and significant coefficient on LTAID in the aid equation
indicates that, on average, a one percentage point increase in recipient
country’s total external debt raises the amount of total aid received by about
0.16 percent. The coefficient of the arms transfer variable (ARMS), which is
used to measure whether total aid is given for strategic reasons, has an
intuitive sign but is statistically insignificant indicating that strategic or
political reasons captured by this variable are not a significant determinant for
aid allocation decisions.
The results indicate that democracy is positively related to GDP per
capita. This is in line with Barro (1996), who argues that greater democracy
stimulates growth; however, he later suggests that “democracy enhances
growth at lower levels of political freedom,” implying diminishing returns to
additional democracy. The results also show that the democracy variable is
positively related to total aid and highly significant, indicating that countries
that are more democratic receive more aid; for example, each unit increase in
the democracy index results in receiving, on average, approximately 8% more
total aid. However, the democracy variable does not explain corruption in the
recipient country. Taken together, the results indicate that foreign aid directed
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to promote democracy has a positive impact in improving the economic
condition of the recipient country.
As expected, the recipient country’s adult illiteracy rate (ILLITERACY)
is negatively related to GDP per capita; Specifically, a one percent increase in
the illiteracy rate will reduce the recipient country’s GDP per capita by about
2.3 percent. This result is in line with Lucas (1988), who finds that countries
with a highly educated work force have higher economic growth opportunities.
The estimated coefficient of the openness variable (OP) in the corruption
equation has an intuitive negative sign but is statistically insignificant; thus,
openness does not explain corruption in the recipient country. Similar to the
results in the previous chapter, the results here suggest that corruption
increases with high racial, nationality or language divisions; this is indicated
by the positive and significant coefficient on the ETHT variable. However,
ethnic tension does not explain GDP per capita.
Model 5: Bilateral Aid, Corruption, and Economic Growth
In order to refine the above results and examine whether there are any
differences between the source of aid with respect to their effect on growth, I
break total aid up into its component parts – bilateral aid and multilateral aid.
I begin with the examination of the relationship between bilateral aid,
corruption, and economic growth. The dependent variables, the natural log of
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bilateral aid, corruption, and the natural log of GDP per capita are represented
by the following system of equations, [M5]:
LBIL = δ 0 + δ 1COR + δ 2 LGDPC + δ 3 LPOP + δ 4 SURPNEG1 + δ 5 SURPNEG 2 +

δ 6 SURPNEG3 + δ 7 SURPNEG 4 + δ 8 SURPNEG5 + δ 9 INF + δ 10 DEM +
δ 11 ARMS + δ 12 LTDEBT + ε δ
COR = γ 0 + γ 1 LBIL + γ 2 LGDPC + γ 3 OP + γ 4 ETHT + γ 5 DEM + ε γ

[ M5.1]
[M5.2]

LGDPC = λ 0 + λ1COR + λ 2 LBIL + λ3 LPOP + λ 4 SURPNEG1 + λ5 SURPNEG 2 +

λ 6 SURPNEG3 + λ7 SURPNEG 4 + λ8 SURPNEG5 + λ9 INF + λ10 DEM +
λ11 ETHT + λ12 ILLITERACY + ε λ

[M5.3]

This specification allows LBIL, COR, and LGDPC to be simultaneously
determined.
Following Hill, Griffiths and Judge (1997), [M5] can be estimated by first
estimating the parameters of the reduced form equations using ordinary least
squares (OLS) and obtaining the predicted values for the bilateral aid (LBIL),
corruption (COR), and GDP per capita (LGDPC) equations. The reduced form
equation expresses each endogenous variable, LBIL, COR, and LGDPC, in
terms of the exogenous variables LPOP, SURPNEG1 SURPNEG2, SURPNEG3,
SURPNEG4, SURPNEG5, INF, DEM, ARMS, LTDEBT, OP, ETHT,
ILLITERACY, and the intercept variable, plus an error term. Let LBIL , COR ,
and LGDPC denote these predicted values 23.
The second stage of the process uses these estimates and involves
estimating the following system of equations:
23

The result of these “first-stage” regressions are presented in Table 14 Appendix E
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LBIL = δ 0 + δ 1 COR + δ 2 LGDPC + δ 3 LPOP + δ 4 SURPNEG1 + δ 5 SURPNEG 2 +

δ 6 SURPNEG3 + δ 7 SURPNEG 4 + δ 8 SURPNEG5 + δ 9 INF + δ 10 DEM +
δ 11 ARMS + δ 12 LTDEBT + u1
COR = γ 0 + γ 1 LBIL + γ 2 LGDPC + γ 3 OP + γ 4 ETHT + γ 5 DEM + u 2

[ M5.4]
[M5.5]

LGDPC = λ 0 + λ1 COR + λ 2 LBIL + λ3 LPOP + λ 4 SURPNEG1 + λ5 SURPNEG 2 +

λ 6 SURPNEG3 + λ7 SURPNEG 4 + λ8 SURPNEG5 + λ9 INF + λ10 DEM +
λ11 ETHT + λ12 ILLITERACY + u 3

[M5.6]

where [M5.4], [M5.5], and [M5.6] are estimated using ordinary least squares
(OLS). The results of this estimation are provided in Table 6.
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Table 6
Second Stage Regression Results Examining the Simultaneity Between
Bilateral Aid, Corruption, and per capita GDP in Africa
Coefficient
Intercept
COR

LBIL
1.899885
(1.219664)
0.004694
(0.200893)

Dependent Variable
COR
6.090241*
(0.885754)
-0.23538*
(0.112508)
-0.28305*
(0.078533)

LBIL
LGDPC
LPOP
SURPNEG1
SURPNEG2
SURPNEG3
SURPNEG4
SURPNEG5
INF

-0.19907*
(0.104173)
-0.02258
(0.078864)
0.016940
(0.145393)
0.373284*
(0.147829)
0.736374*
(0.187821)
0.926102*
(0.158975)
0.794473*
(0.159697)
-0.00081
(0.001204)

-0.34412*
(0.069718)
-0.50871*
(0.162277)
-0.990289*
(0.144240)
-1.11675*
(0.193849)
-1.27565*
(0.207983)
-0.84833*
(0.213086)
-0.00384*
(0.001385)

OP
ETHT
DEM
ARMS
LTDEBT

LGDPC
11.53084*
(0.736783)
-0.38718
(0.240477)
0.496835*
(0.145517)

0.077842*
(0.033552)
0.003888
(0.093649)
0.199363*
(0.059345)

-0.00318
(0.002417)
0.188287*
(0.040773)
-0.04113
(0.035664)

0.063309
(0.054083)
0.063520**
(0.033091)

R2=0.15169
F=12.84

-0.02155*
(0.002373)
R2=0.47372
F=26.40

ILLITERACY
R2=0.36163
F=16.62

(standard errors in parenthesis)

*Statistically significant at the 95% level
** Statistically significant at the 90% level.
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Model 5: Discussion
Examining the bilateral portion of total aid reveals some interesting
differences between this type of aid and total aid in their relation to corruption
and GDP per capita. The results of this model indicate that corruption has no
significant effect on the amount of bilateral aid received but the continued
receipt of bilateral aid appears to reduce corruption. This result could be
explained by the fact that reductions in corruption may be a pre-condition for
continued receipt of bilateral aid. To this end, Tavares (2003) argues that one
possibility for the negative relationship between aid and corruption is “a
conditionality effect”; donor countries may require potential recipients to
reduce corruption as a pre-condition for aid. These results support the
conjecture that corruption is an underlying problem and aid improves the
situation. The coefficient on COR in the LGDPC column is negative, although
is insignificant; corruption does not affect GDP per capita.
The estimated coefficients also show that bilateral aid favors poorer
countries and the receipt of bilateral aid appears to boost GDP per capita; the
negative and highly significant coefficient on LGDPC in the bilateral aid
equation indicates that a one percentage point decrease in the recipient’s real
GDP per capita raises the amount of bilateral aid received by about 0.2
percent, while the positive and a highly significant coefficient on LBIL in the
GDP per capita equation indicates that a one percentage point increase in the
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amount of bilateral aid received raises the recipient country’s GDP per capita
by about 0.5 percent. Taken together, the result shows that bilateral aid and
GDP per capita are simultaneously determined. The results also indicate that
corruption does not explain GDP per capita in the recipient country, but an
increase in GDP per capita does appear to lower the level of corruption.
Like the results of the model in the previous chapter, the results here
indicate that an increase in population reduces GDP per capita; the negative
and highly significant coefficient on LPOP in the GDP per capita equation
indicates that a one percentage point increase in population size reduces the
recipient country’s GDP per capita by about 0.34 percent. However, unlike
previous results, the population variable (LPOP) is negatively associated with
the amount of bilateral aid received, but is statistically insignificant.
Examining only bilateral aid did not change the overall effects of the
fiscal policy variables (SURPNEG1 through SURPNEG5) on the bilateral aid
allocation decision and on GDP per capita. The results indicate that bilateral
aid increases with the recipient country’s deficit. Specifically, compared to
countries with a surplus, on average, countries with a medium deficit in the
third quintile are expected to receive about 109% more in bilateral aid, while
countries with a deficit in the highest quintile are expected to receive about
121% more in bilateral aid. This result is indicated by the positive coefficients
on the SURPNEG3 and SURPNEG5 variables respectively.
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Similarly, as in combined model, the result shows that a deficit is
negatively related to the recipient country’s GDP per capita; the result
indicates that compared to countries with a surplus, on average, countries
with a small deficit in the first quintile captured by SURPNEG1 are expected
to have about 40% less per capita GDP, while countries with a deficit in the
fourth quintile captured by SURPNEG4 are expected to have about 58% less
GDP per capita. Again, compared to countries with a surplus, it appears that
fiscal policy leading to a deficit in general leads to smaller GDP per capita.
Like in the combined model, this model focusing on bilateral aid indicates that
responsible monetary policy, resulting in lower inflation, increases GDP; this
is indicated by the negative and significant coefficient on the INF variable.
As expected, ethnic tension is positively related to corruption but does
not appear to explain the recipient country’s GDP per capita. The result also
shows that the openness of the recipient economy has no statistically
significant effect on corruption. Similarly, the results indicate that being a
democratic country has no significant effect on the level of corruption in the
recipient country. However, consistent with the results of Model 4, countries
with higher freedom, those that are more democratic, receive more bilateral
aid. Also, countries with higher degrees of freedom have higher GDP per
capita than those that are under a more dictatorial regime; for example, each
unit increase in the democracy index results in receiving, on average, about 8%
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more bilateral aid, while increasing the recipient country’s GDP per capita by
about 6.3%. The results also show that the coefficient on the democracy
variable, DEM, in the corruption equation has an intuitive sign but is
statistically insignificant.
Not surprisingly, illiteracy is negatively related to the recipient
country’s economy suggesting that an educated work force is vital for the
growth of the economy; for example, a one percentage point increase in the
illiteracy rate reduces the recipient country’s GDP per capita by about 2.2
percent.
Finally, the total external debt of the recipient’s economy is positively
related to bilateral aid. As explained in Model 1, the result could be explained
by the willingness of donors to help highly indebted countries. The coefficient
of the arms transfer variable (ARMS), which is used to measure whether aid is
given for strategic reasons, has an intuitive sign but is statistically
insignificant, indicating that strategic or political reasons are not a significant
determinant of bilateral aid allocation to sub-Saharan African countries over
the sample period.
Model 6: Multilateral Aid, Corruption, and Economic Growth
In this section I examine the relationship between multilateral aid,
corruption, and economic growth. All the variables are as defined in the
previous models. The dependent variables, natural log of multilateral aid,
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corruption, and natural log of GDP per capita, are represented by the following
system of equations, which runs parallel to Models IV and V, [M6]:
LMUL = φ 0 + φ1COR + φ 2 LGDPC + φ 3 LPOP + φ 4 SURPNEG1 + φ 5 SURPNEG 2 +

φ 6 SURPNEG3 + φ 7 SURPNEG 4 + φ8 SURPNEG5 + φ 9 INF + φ10 DEM +
φ11 ARMS + φ12 LTDEBT + ε φ
COR = ϕ 0 + ϕ1 LMUL + ϕ 2 LGDPC + ϕ 3 OP + ϕ 4 ETHT + ϕ 5 DEM + ε ϕ

[ M6.1]
[M6.2]

LGDPC = Γ0 + Γ1COR + Γ2 LMUL + Γ3 LPOP + Γ4 SURPNEG1 + Γ5 SURPNEG 2 +
Γ6 SURPNEG3 + Γ 7 SURPNEG 4 + Γ 8 SURPNEG5 + Γ 9 INF + Γ10 DEM +
Γ11 ETHT + Γ12 ILLITERACY + ε Γ

[M6.3]

This specification allows LMUL, COR, and LGDPC to be simultaneously
determined.
Following Hill, Griffiths and Judge (1997), [M6] can be estimated by first
estimating the parameters of the reduced form equations using ordinary least
squares (OLS) and obtaining the predicted values for the multilateral aid
(LMUL), corruption (COR), and GDP per capita (LGDPC) equations. The
reduced form equations express each endogenous variable, LMUL, COR, and
LGDPC, in terms of the exogenous variables LPOP, SURPNEG1, SURPNEG2,
SURPNEG3, SURPNEG4, SURPNEG5, INF, DEM, ARMS, LTDEBT, OP,
ETHT, ILLITERACY, and the intercept variable, plus an error term. Let
LMUL , COR , and LGDPC denote the predicted values 24.

24

The result of these “first-stage” regressions are presented in Table 15 Appendix E
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The second stage of the process uses these estimates and involves
estimating the following system of equations:
LMUL = φ 0 + φ1 COR + φ 2 LGDPC + φ 3 LPOP + φ 4 SURPNEG1 + φ 5 SURPNEG 2 +

φ 6 SURPNEG3 + φ 7 SURPNEG 4 + φ8 SURPNEG5 + φ 9 INF + φ10 DEM +
φ11 ARMS + φ12 LTDEBT + ν 1
COR = ϕ 0 + ϕ1 LMUL + ϕ 2 LGDPC + ϕ 3 OP + ϕ 4 ETHT + ϕ 5 DEM + ν 2

[ M6.4]
[M6.5]

LGDPC = Γ0 + Γ1 COR + Γ2 LMUL + Γ3 LPOP + Γ4 SURPNEG1 + Γ5 SURPNEG 2 +
Γ6 SURPNEG3 + Γ 7 SURPNEG 4 + Γ 8 SURPNEG5 + Γ 9 INF + Γ10 DEM +
Γ11 ETHT + Γ12 ILLITERACY + ν 3

[M6.6]

where [M6.4], [M6.5], and [M6.6] are estimated using ordinary least squares
(OLS). The results of this estimation are provided in Table 7.
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Table 7
Second Stage Regression Results Examining the Simultaneity Between
Multilateral Aid, Corruption, and per capita GDP in Africa
Coefficient
Intercept
COR

LMUL
2.454156
(1.521749)
-0.14122
(0.250650)

Dependent Variable
COR
5.095586*
(1.494626)
-0.06554
(0.143499)
-0.31142*
(0.146192)

LMUL
LGDPC
LPOP
SURPNEG1
SURPNEG2
SURPNEG3
SURPNEG4
SURPNEG5
INF

-0.770968*
(0.129974)
0.248860*
(0.098397)
0.085535
(0.181404)
0.240473
(0.184443)
0.478578*
(0.234340)
0.571333*
(0.198349)
0.152762
(0.199250)
0.002118
(0.001502)

0.231008
(0.240449)
-0.10977
(0.246451)
-0.18584
(289719)
-0.04246
(0.371001)
0.103810
(0.435381)
-0.22053
(0.217873)
0.001443
(0.002775)

OP
ETHT
DEM
ARMS
LTDEBT

LGDPC
7.914646*
(2.263019)
-0.65732*
(0.276395)
-0.83228*
(0.404025)

0.156837*
(0.041862)
0.115834
(0.116844)
0.096087
(0.074044)

-0.00055
(0.002360)
0.192027*
(0.042365)
-0.04510
(0.044129)

0.111687*
(0.058601)
0.132808*
(0.044056)

R2=0.13441
F=11.15

-0.00571*
(0.006583)
R2=0.43406
F=22.50

ILLITERACY
R2=0.44892
F=23.90

(standard errors in parenthesis)

*Statistically significant at the 95% level
** Statistically significant at the 90% level.
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Model 6: Discussion
Similar to the results in the previous chapter, these results also indicate
that the level of corruption in the recipient country does not explain the
amount of multilateral aid received. However, unlike the result in chapter IV,
the slightly negative but insignificant coefficient on multilateral aid variable,
LMUL, in the corruption equation indicates that multilateral aid does not
affect the level of corruption in the recipient country.
The corruption variable (COR) in the GDP per capita equation indicates
that corruption is negatively related to GDP per capita. The negative and
highly significant coefficient on COR in the GDP per capita equation indicates
that a one unit increase in the corruption index, on average, reduces the
recipient country’s GDP per capita by about 65% percent. This result is in line
with other authors such as Mauro (1995) who argue that corruption has a
negative impact on investment and growth. Mauro finds that an increase in
corruption of one standard deviation reduces investment by 5% of GDP and
growth by 0.05% of GDP. Other authors arrive at similar conclusions; for
example, see Rose-Ackerman (1997), Shleifer and Vishny (1993), and Keefer
and Knack (1995).
The results indicate that multilateral aid is negatively related to the
recipient country’s GDP per capita, but does not appear to explain the level of
corruption in the recipient country. In other words, multilateral aid appears to
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lower the recipient country’s GDP per capita. The negative and statistically
significant coefficient on the multilateral aid variable, LMUL, in the GDP per
capita equation indicates that a one percent increase in multilateral aid
reduces the recipient country’s GDP per capita by about 0.8 percent. Along this
line, Ram (2003) finds that a one percentage point increase in multilateral aid
reduces the growth rate by one half to one percentage point. Ram argues that
although aid in general positively affects growth, multilateral aid in its current
form is unlike bilateral aid does not improve growth in the recipient countries.
This model for multilateral aid indicates that the recipient country’s
need is a significant determinant for multilateral aid decisions; the negative
and highly significant coefficient on LGDPC in the multilateral aid equation
indicates that a one percentage point decrease in the recipient’s real GDP per
capita raises the amount of multilateral aid received by about 0.77 percent.
The result also shows that an increase in real GDP per capita reduces the level
of corruption in the recipient country. These results could be explained by the
fact that as income increases the need for rent-seeking activity will fall, since
individuals are now more self-sufficient and the moral cost of engaging in rentseeking activity in society will more likely outweigh the benefit of bribes.
The estimated coefficients also show that multilateral aid increases with
population, but does not appear to explain the recipient country’s GDP per
capita; for example, the positive and highly significant coefficient on LPOP in
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the multilateral aid equation indicates that a one percentage point increase in
population raises the amount of multilateral aid received by about 0.25
percent, while the positive but statistically insignificant coefficient on LPOP in
the GDP per capita equation indicates that population is not a significant
determinant for GDP per capita in sub-Saharan African countries over the
sample period. Taken together, the results show that while multilateral aid
increases with population, population has no significant impact on GDP per
capita.
Consistent with the results of the model in Chapter IV, the results here
indicate that overall, sound fiscal or monetary policy in the recipient country
does not affect multilateral aid allocations. In fact, as indicated by the positive
coefficients on the fiscal policy variables SURPNEG3 and SURPNEG4 in the
multilateral aid equation, countries with average deficits get more aid than do
countries with a surplus. The coefficients on the remaining fiscal policy
variables (SURPNEG1, SURPNEG2, and SURPNEG5) and the monetary
policy variable (INF) remain insignificant, confirming my previous result that
sound fiscal and monetary policies are not the main determinant for
multilateral aid decisions. Rather, it appears that the recipient country’s need
plays a significant role in determining the allocation of multilateral aid.
The results also show that the coefficients on the openness variable (OP)
and the democracy variable (DEM) in the corruption equation have an
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intuitive sign, but are statistically insignificant; this indicates that the
openness of the recipient country’s economy as well as being democratic has no
significant impact on the level of corruption in the recipient country. However,
consistent with previous results, ethnic tension appears to foster corruption.
Unlike the finding by Easterly and Levine (1997) who argue that ethnolinguistic fractionalization reduces economic growth, the ethnic tension
variable, ETHT, in the GDP per capita equation indicates that high racial,
nationality, or language division is positively associated with the recipient
country’s GDP per capita. This result is surprising given high ethnic tension
most likely will encourage internal conflict and civil war which, in turn, may
negatively affect growth.
As expected, more democratic countries receive more multilateral aid,
and democracy boosts GDP per capita; this is indicated by the democracy
variable (DEM) in the multilateral aid and GDP per capita equations
respectively. Each unit increase in the democracy index results in receiving, on
average, about 15.7% more multilateral aid, while each unit increase in the
democracy index appears to boost the recipient country’s GDP per capita by
about 13%. Taken together, the results suggest that aid increases the level of
democracy in the recipient country, and in turn, democracy has a significantly
positive effect on the recipient country’s overall economy.
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Similar to my finding in Model 4 where I combined both multilateral
and bilateral aid together, illiteracy appears to negatively affect the recipient
country’s GDP per capita growth; the results here indicate that a one percent
increase in the recipient country’s illiteracy rate will reduce the real GDP per
capita by about 0.5 percent. This confirms the previous result that an educated
work force is vital for the growth of the overall economy.
Finally, the estimated coefficients on the total external debt (LTDEBT)
and arms transfer (ARMS) variables in the multilateral aid equation indicate
that both political or strategic reasons as well as the level of debt in the
recipient country have no significant effect on the level of multilateral aid
given to that country. This finding is not surprising; these results imply that
multilateral aid is given based on the need of the recipient country as
indicated by the LGDPC variable in multilateral aid equation.
Concluding Comments
Examining the relationship between foreign aid, corruption, and GDP in
sub-Saharan Africa provides evidence that, overall, there is a negative and
significant association between the recipient country’s GDP per capita and its
deficit. According to Mankiw (2004), budget deficits reduce national saving,
which in turn increase interest rates and reduce investment. Thus, this fall in
private investment will lead to a fall in growth. Given that any size deficit has
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a negative impact on GDP per capita, the key policy implication of these
findings is for countries to address the deficit problem.
The results also provide some evidence that foreign aid is positively
related to democracy, and democracy positively affects the recipient country’s
real GDP per capita. Therefore, it appears that aid given to promote
democracy boosts economic growth. Given this positive effect of democracy on
GDP per capita, one implication for donors is to condition both multilateral
and bilateral aid on the recipient country’s actions in promoting democratic
reforms.
The findings also suggest that illiteracy is one of the significant
detrimental factors for long-term growth in sub-Saharan Africa. Consistently
throughout the models, the coefficient on the adult illiteracy variable
(ILLITERACY) is negatively associated with the recipient country’s GDP per
capita. It is not surprising that education is very important for any nation’s
standard of living. An educated person has a better chance to generate new
ideas on how to best increase productivity. Therefore, key policy implications
for sub-Saharan governments are to continue to encourage private investment
in education and to create public awareness of the benefits of education.
Finally, in exploring the relationship between foreign aid, corruption,
and GDP per capita, I find that there are significant differences between
multilateral and bilateral aid that are obscured by combining the two types of

76

aid into a single measure. Using a simultaneous system of equations
describing aid, corruption, and GDP per capita, I find that while the receipt of
both bilateral aid and multilateral aid appears to reduce the level of
corruption, there is significant difference between the two types of aid in
relation to the recipient country’s GDP per capita. The results suggest that
while bilateral aid increases the recipient country’s real GDP per capita,
multilateral aid appears to reduce GDP per capita and has no significant effect
on the level of corruption in the recipient country. This result suggests that
requirements placed in multilateral aid contracts are not effective in reducing
corruption; it may be that much of multilateral aid is skimmed off through
rent-seeking rather than being used for productive activities.

77

CHAPTER VI
FOREIGN AID AND CORRUPTION: A FIXED EFFECTS MODEL
APPROACH
INTRODUCTION
While there are a number of studies focusing on the relationship
between foreign aid and corruption, disagreement persists. One view is that
foreign aid increases corruption (see for example Svensson, 2000 and
Economides et. al., 2004). An opposing view concludes that rather than
fostering corruption, foreign aid actually reduces corruption in recipient
countries (Tavares 2003).
In this chapter I use a two stage least squares fixed effects model to
examine the linkage between foreign aid and the level of corruption.
Accounting for fixed effects allows me to examine whether unobserved
characteristics of recipient countries play a role in explaining the impact of aid
on corruption. Possible unobserved characteristics include each country’s
unique colonial history and strategic value to potential donors. These countryspecific characteristics may be particularly important since they play a
significant role in the allocation of foreign aid. According to Capellán and
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Gomez (2007), former French colonies on average receive about 18 million
dollars more in French aid than non-French colonies, whereas the UK and
Canada are generous to members of the former British Commonwealth.
Contrary to the findings in the previous chapter, where I found democratic
countries receive more aid, Alesina and Dollar (2000) find that former colonies
that are not democratic get about twice as much aid as democratic countries
that are not former colonies. In addition, they find that countries that have a
relatively long colonial history receive about 87 percent more in aid than do
non-former colonies. Since previous studies indicate that country specific
characteristics are important in influencing the provision of aid and the
linkages between aid and corruption, a fixed effects model is appropriate.
In order to implement the fixed effects model, I extend the model in
Chapter IV by adding country specific dummy variables to the equations. The
revised system of equations is given as [M7]:
LTAID = α 0 + α 1COR + α 2 LGDPC + α 3 LPOP + α 4 SURPNEG1 + α 5 SURPNEG 2 +

α 6 SURPNEG 3 + α 7 SURPNEG 4 + α 8 SURPNEG5 + α 9 INF + α 10 DEM +
α 11 ARMS + α 12 LTDEBT + (δ 1 + δ 2 + ... + δ N −1 ) + ε α
COR = β 0 + β 1 LTAID + β 2 LGDPC + β 3 OP + β 4 ETHT + β 5 DEM +
(η1 + η 2 ... + η N −1 ) + ε β

[M7.1]
[M7.2]

where ( δ 1 + δ 2 + ... + δ N −1 ) and (η1 + η 2 ... + η N −1 ) are the fixed effects variables for
each country except Somalia in the sample. Somalia is chosen as a reference
country on the grounds that it had no reliable government for over a decade.
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This country, Somalia, was and still is in complete anarchy, without a stable
government. Somalia’s unfortunate position as a country without a viable
government makes it a benchmark against which to compare the rest of subSaharan Africa with regard to corruption, inflow of aid, ethnic tension,
democracy and the other variables included in the model.
Following Hill, Griffiths and Judge (1997), [M7] can be estimated by first
estimating the parameters of the reduced form equations using ordinary least
squares (OLS) and obtaining the predicted values for both the aid (LTAID) and
the corruption (COR ) variables 25.
The second stage of the process incorporates these estimates as
independent variables and involves re-estimating the following system of
equations:
LTAID = α 0 + α 1 COR + α 2 LGDPC + α 3 LPOP + α 4 SURPNEG1 + α 5 SURPNEG 2 +

α 6 SURPNEG 3 + α 7 SURPNEG 4 + α 8 SURPNEG5 + α 9 INF + α 10 DEM +
α 11 ARMS + α 12 LTDEBT + (δ 1 + δ 2 + ... + δ N −1 ) + V A

[M7.3]

COR = β 0 + β 1 LTAID + β 2 LGDPC + β 3 OP + β 4 ETHT + β 5 DEM +
(η1 + η 2 ... + η N −1 ) + V B

[M7.4] .

Equations [M7.3] and [M7.4] are estimated using OLS. The estimation results
of this system of equations are provided in Table 8, and are contrasted with
the “pooled” results obtained previously in Chapter IV. Table 9 presents the
country specific effects from the two equations.
25

The results of these “first-stage” regressions are presented in Table 16 Appendix E
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Table 8
Second Stage Regression Results Examining the Simultaneity Between
Corruption and Foreign Aid in Africa Using a Fixed Effects Model

Coefficient
Intercept
COR
LTAID
LGDPC
LPOP
SURPNEG1
SURPNEG2
SURPNEG3
SURPNEG4
SURPNEG5
INF

Pooled Results
LTAID
COR
-0.14003
4.973008*
(0.998585)
(0.666358)
0.354925**
(0.193063)
-0.17573*
(0.078080)
-0.17555*
-0.09142**
(0.062476)
(0.053431)
0.222808*
(0.060547)
-0.08790
(0.143608)

ETHT
DEM
ARMS
LTDEBT

-0.032893
(0.137668)

0.562577*
(0.158446)
0.848786*
(0.194439)
0.912445*
(0.168501)
0.733041*
(0.174002)
-0.00007**
(0.000037)

OP

0.082636**
(0.030278)
0.106978
(0.0085686)
0.065104
(0.068184)
R2 =
0.38949, F =
27.38

Fixed Effects Results
LTAID
COR
12.75034*
-3.93631*
(3.724640)
(1.581262)
0.223980
(0.209735)
-0.11359
(0.127437)
-0.00381
1.222821*
(0.154542)
(0.188878)
-1.00544*
(0.176219)
-0.14370
(0.114772)

0.189926
(0.183164)
0.213462
(0.147973)
0.228002
(0.156328)
-0.00004
(0.000028)
-0.00477*
(0.001600)
0.205508*
(0.036742)
-0.07922
(0.030033)

R2 = 0.12388, F =
14.76

0.077050*
(0.026496)
0.089657
(0.0667254)
0.374621*
(0.094795)
R2 = 0.71315
F = 28.71

(standard errors in parenthesis)

*Statistically significant at the 95% level
** Statistically significant at the 90% level.
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-0.00474**
(0.002737)
0.032516
(0.036721)
0.121602*
(0.032911)

R2 = 0.59694
F = 20.82

Fixed Effects by Country: Total foreign Aid and Corruption
Country
Angola
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
Congo.Dem.Rep(Zaire)
Congo Republic
Cote d Ivoire
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Kenya
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mozambique
Namibia

Dependent Variable
LTAID
COR
-0.08256
0.551379
(0.215112)
(0.360811)
-2.59630*
-2.88652*
(0.482795)
(0.401460)
0.595602*
0.806704*
(0.250900)
(0.287873)
0.297316*
0.239436
(0.187917)
(0.214795)
0.926582*
3.855194*
(0.366499)
(0.332008)
-2.23383*
-0.87581*
(0.314977)
(0.306481)
0.091112
-0.33844
(0.0214612)
(0.224486)
2.367586*
2.686105*
(0.406115)
(0.401107)
-3.63459*
-1.23896*
(0.509197)
(0.444281)
-2.75753*
0.390472
(0.536092)
(0.360873)
0.845703*
1.305739*
(0.223443)
(0.299305)
-0.31835
-0.16273
(0.212956)
(0.236105)
-2.56606*
2.019261*
(0.516719)
(0.364473)
1.308640*
0.601719*
(0.237388)
(0.226896)
-2.42524*
1.864250*
(0.349726)
(0.303124)
0.280673
-0.48939**
(0.225303)
(0.280464)
0.401353
1.190867
(0.282967)
(0.347649)
0.181523
1.353113*
(0.253356)
(0.295659)
1.258200*
0.862686*
(0.266246)
(0.334564)
-1.09932*
-2.35537*
(0.548193)
(0.394861)
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Table 9 (Continued)
Country
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

LTAID
0.188309
(0.253933)
0.827203**
(0.467506)
0.313886
(0.204375)
-1.15390*
(0.319348)
0.809403*
(0.420574)
0.879433*
(0.304675)
1.959466*
(0.255001)
-1.30331*
(0.288244)
1.222112*
(0.233999)
0.205645
(0.213514)
0.082560
(0.215112)

COR
1.678281*
(0.301107)
1.834133*
(0.259842)
-0.060680
(0.235851)
1.738571*
(0.311380)
-3.58659*
(0.414117)
1.805311*
(0.252609)
0.512197*
(0.258125)
1.835053*
(0.312756)
1.551929*
(0.284352)
0.633317*
(0.242945)
-0.55133
(0.360811)

(standard errors in parenthesis)
*Statistically significant at the 95% level
** Statistically significant at the 90% level.

Model Diagnostics
Before discussing the results, a few words are necessary about the
diagnostic checks performed to determine whether the usage of the fixed
effects model is appropriate. The high value of the F test statistic (20.37) and
its associated low p value (p<.0001) in the aid equation (LTAID), and the F test
statistic (12.59) and its associated low p value (p<.0001) in the corruption
equation (COR) both show that the null hypotheses (all dummy parameters
except one are zero) in both equations are rejected; no individual fixed effect is
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rejected. This establishes the fact that country-specific characteristics do play
a vital role. Therefore, I conclude that the fixed effects model is better than the
pooled OLS model. Further more, the use of a random effects model was
rejected based on the Hausman specification test. The high value of the
Hausman test statistic (15.70), referred to as the m-statistic, and its associated
low p value (0.0734) in the aid equation (LTAID), and the Hausman test
statistic (17.98) and its associated low p value (0.0354) in the corruption
equation show that the null hypotheses that the individual country effects are
uncorrelated with the other regressors are rejected in both models; thus, a
fixed effect model is preferred.
Fixed Effects Model: Discussion
Unlike the pooled OLS model where foreign aid is positively related to
corruption, the coefficient on the corruption variable (COR) in the fixed effects
model is not statistically significant; corruption has no significant effect on the
amount of total aid received. This is in line with the Alesina and Weder (2002)
findings that corruption does not affect aid levels. In addition, unlike the
pooled result, the coefficient on total foreign aid (LTAID) in the fixed effects
model is statistically insignificant suggesting that foreign aid does not affect
the level of corruption in a recipient country.
Using the fixed effects model reduces the statistical significance of the
effect of the recipient country’s economy (LGDPC) on the amount of foreign aid
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received; in the fixed effects model the GDP per capita variable is insignificant.
It also reduces the statistical significance of both fiscal and monetary policy
variables (SURPNEG2, SURPNEG3, SURPNEG4, SURPNEG5, and INF) on
the amount of foreign aid received. In the fixed effects model, both fiscal and
monetary policy variables are insignificant, although they have the same sign
as the significant coefficients in the pooled OLS model. This implies that
donors do not necessarily give aid based on good fiscal or monetary policy. This
is consistent with the Burnside and Dollar (2000) findings that total foreign
aid does not favor good monetary and/or fiscal policy.
One of the main differences between the two estimation results concerns
the sign and size of the population variable (LPOP). In the fixed effects model,
the coefficient on the population variable is negative and significant, and the
size of coefficient is more than quadruple compared to the pooled model. This
result of the fixed effects model implies that, ceteris paribus, countries with a
higher population receive less aid. For example, the negative and significant
coefficient on LPOP in the aid equation indicates that a one percentage point
increase in population size leads to a decrease in the amount of total foreign
aid received by about 1 percent. In other words, when accounting for countryspecific effects, the amount of aid allocation falls with population size. Alesina
and Dollar (2000) show that population plays a key role in determining the
allocation of aid. They argue that countries with a small population receive
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more foreign aid. It may be in the donors’ best interest to give to small
countries where the effect per dollar spent may be larger, thereby providing
some evidence of success. Boone (1996) finds that a 10% increase in the size of
population reduces the aid/GNP ratio by 0.0032. He argues that one of the
main reasons is that large nominal transfers will come under greater public
scrutiny than relatively smaller amounts; thus donors hesitate to give large
amounts to any one country. Similarly, Trumbull and Wall (1994) find that a
country twice the size of another country receives about 67% less official
development assistance (ODA) per capita.
Another significant difference between the results of the two models is
that including fixed effects causes the coefficient of the recipient GDP per
capita variable (LGDPC) to change sign in the COR equation; this indicates a
positive relationship between the size of the recipient’s economy and
corruption. To this end, the results indicate that the higher the country’s per
capita GDP, the higher the level of corruption, implying different levels of
corruption across countries due to differences in per capita GDP. This is
consistent with Frechette (2006) and Braun and Di Tella (2004), who argue
that corruption increases with income. Using panel data analysis, Braun and
Di Tella find that recipient country GDP per capita is positively related to
corruption.
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The third significant difference between the two types of models is
related to the impact of democracy on corruption in the recipient country. In
the fixed effects model, the coefficient on the democracy variable (DEM) in the
corruption equation is positive and highly significant. This result of the fixed
effects model implies that, ceteris paribus, more democracy is associated with
more corruption. The result is surprising given democracy should encourage
more open and transparent government, thereby reducing the rent-seeking
activities often associated with more autocratic, non-transparent governments.
However, Mohtadi and Roe (2003) argue that democracy at its initial stage
suffers from an inadequate level of transparency and public scrutiny, causing
the level of corruption to initially increase, although it falls as democracy
becomes more mature. The coefficient on the democracy variable in the aid
equation (LTAID) continues to be positive and highly significant in both
models, indicating that countries that are more democratic receive more
foreign aid; this result indicates that each unit increase in the democracy
variable (DEM) will result in getting, on average, about 7.7% more total
foreign aid. The result supports the Alesina and Dollar (2000) initial findings
that more democratic countries receive 39 percent more aid than do nondemocratic countries.
The coefficient for the openness variable (OP) under the fixed effects
model is line with that of the pooled OLS estimation; it is negatively related to
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corruption in both models. This confirms the argument that openness in a
recipient country reduces corruption. The possibility that openness may reduce
corruption has been examined in the recent economic development literature
(Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000, Knorich and Gokcekus 2006). Sandholtz and
Koetzle argue that by facilitating economic competition through increased
involvement in trade openness can reduce corruption. Knorich and Gokcekus
found that an increase in the quality and degree of openness reduces
corruption.
The fixed effect model reduces the statistical significance of the effect of
ethnic tension on corruption. In the fixed effects model, this variable is not
found to be important in explaining corruption once individual country-specific
characteristics are accounted for, although it has the same sign as the
significant coefficient in the pooled OLS model. Thus, the result does not
support the results of the pooled OLS model, which argues that ethnic tension
in a recipient country fosters corruption.
Unlike the pooled OLS model, the result here indicates that total
external debt (LTDEBT), an indicator for whether highly indebted countries
receive more or less aid, is positively related to total foreign aid. As discussed
in Chapter IV, this may be explained by the observation that foreign aid,
especially bilateral aid, is given primarily out of strategic interest and
therefore existing debt is overlooked when allocating aid. In addition, it may
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also be the case that donors are simply more willing to help highly indebted
countries; this can be seen by the donors’ push for debt forgiveness through the
Heavily Indebted Countries (HIPCs) Initiative. The coefficient of the arms
transfer variable (ARMS) has an intuitive sign but is statistically insignificant,
confirming the results of the pooled OLS model that strategic or political
reasons are not the main determinants of aid decisions to the sub-Saharan
African countries.
Further comments on the use of Fixed Effects Model
In a fixed effects model the country fixed effects capture the unique
characteristics of each country not accounted for by the other variables. Thus,
holding all of the other independent variables constant, a country’s unique
characteristics result in it receiving more or less aid and being more or less
corrupt. The fixed effects estimates indicate these country-specific
characteristics significantly impact aid and corruption.
Therefore, I ask the following question: do unique characteristics of each
country make a difference as to whether it receives more or less aid, and do
these characteristics affect whether the country is more or less corrupt? Given
the results in Table 9, the answer is yes. For example, compared to Somalia,
holding all other independent variables constant, Ethiopia is expected to
receive 10.67 times more total aid, Gabon is expected to receive 0.03 times
more aid, and Cameroon is expected to receive 1.34 times more aid. These
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results indicate that, on average, Ethiopia receives more aid than all others.
This could be explained by the fact that drought and famine is more prevalent
in Ethiopia, and Ethiopia during 80s and 90s engaged in a civil war with
Eritrea; thus donors were generous during this period of famine and post-war
rebuilding. The results also indicate that Gabon receives slightly less aid than
all others except Somalia. Although its natural resources have yet to be
exploited and its people remain poor, the fact that Gabon is privileged with
natural resources such as oil may play a role in not receiving as much aid as
other nations. Thus, the differences in the magnitudes of the fixed effects
coefficients highlight the importance of including country specific
characteristics. Note that not only are the differences between countries
statistically significant, but they are also economically relevant magnitudes.
Now consider the corruption equation. The negative and significant
coefficients for the included fixed effects variables indicate that Somalia is
more corrupt than most of the other countries in the data. The results show
that, all else equal, the Democratic Republic of Congo is more corrupt than all
others, whereas South Africa is less corrupt than all others. This result
confirms that, in addition to the independent variables identified in the model,
corruption is significantly influenced by the unique characteristics of each
country. Thus, it is important to include fixed effects in this model.
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Concluding Comments
I found interesting and significant differences between the fixed effects
model and the pooled OLS model in terms of the relationship between
corruption and foreign aid. While corruption was positively associated with
foreign aid and the receipt of this aid appears to reduce corruption in the
pooled OLS model, it had no significant relationship with foreign aid in the
fixed effects model. This result is in line with Knack’s (2001) finding that there
is no significant relationship between foreign aid and corruption. The results
imply that if I control for country specific characteristics, the hypothesis that
foreign aid and corruption are related is rejected.
Using the fixed effects model, I find a substantial increase in the
coefficient that measures the effect of population size on the amount of aid
received. The size of the coefficient more than quadrupled when compared to
the pooled model. The fixed effects model results also show that democracy
plays a significant role on the amount of aid received. Therefore, the argument
that smaller and more democratic countries receive more aid is supported by
the results of the fixed effects model. Total foreign aid falls with increases in
population size, and aid increases as countries become more democratic. In
addition, both models consistently support the argument that openness
reduces corruption in the recipient country.
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CHAPTER VII
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Three interrelated subjects of interest in applied development economics
have been investigated in this dissertation: the relationship between foreign
aid and corruption, the interaction between foreign aid, corruption, and GDP,
and the application of fixed effects when modeling foreign aid and corruption.
The first study examined the simultaneous relationship between foreign
aid and corruption using a system of two equations: one modeling aid and the
other modeling corruption. Using two stage least squares, the results indicate
that poorer counties receive more aid, while the receipt of this aid, in turn,
reduces the level of corruption in the recipient country. The result also indicate
that more corrupt countries receive more aid, confirming the results by Alesina
and Weder (2002) that highly corrupt countries may actually receive more aid .
In order to refine these results, I divided aid into its bilateral and
multilateral aid components. The subsequent results show that bilateral aid
and corruption are simultaneously determined. These results indicate that
while more corrupt countries receive a greater amount of bilateral aid, the
receipt of both bilateral and multilateral aid reduces the level of corruption.
One possibility for the negative effect of foreign aid on corruption could be
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what Tavares (2003) calls a “conditionality effect”; recipient countries may risk
losing aid if reform efforts are not undertaken. The above result suggests that
reform requirements in current aid decisions are responsible for the reduction
in corruption. Thus, donors should continue to incorporate reform
requirements when granting aid. However, this result disappears when I
refine the model by including the simultaneity of GDP per capita.
The second study analyzed the simultaneity between foreign aid,
corruption, and GDP per capita, and whether these relationships depend upon
the source of the foreign aid. The addition of per capita GDP to the model
provides several insights. These results confirm that total foreign aid and GDP
per capita are simultaneously determined. Poorer countries receive more aid,
while the receipt of this aid, in turn, increases GDP per capita. However, the
results indicate that low corruption does not explain total foreign aid and
foreign aid does not induce corruption. Thus, in this model, the hypothesis that
foreign aid fosters corruption is rejected.
In addition, the results confirm a negative effect of high population on
GDP per capita, a conclusion in line with other authors such as Malthus (1798)
and Cassen (1994). Therefore, addressing the problem of increasing population
in sub-Saharan Africa should be a primary focus of donors in order to promote
growth and development in the continent. Consistent with other authors, such
as Alesina and Dollar (2000), more democratic countries receive more aid while
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democracy, in turn, positively affects GDP. This result is similar to the
findings of Barro (1996). One implication is that foreign aid targeted to
improve democracy in the recipient country may be a more effective means of
promoting growth and development. The results also indicate that fiscal policy
leading to deficits in general results in a smaller GDP per capita, with small to
moderately high deficits having a bigger negative effect on a country’s economy
than running a surplus.
The last study, found in Chapter VI, investigated the relationship
between foreign aid and the level of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa using a
fixed effects model. Contrary to the pooled OLS model, the results from the
fixed effects model indicated no significant effect of corruption on the amount
of total foreign aid received. Similarly, unlike the results from the pooled OLS
model in which aid reduces corruption, these results show that the receipt of
aid has no significant impact on the level of corruption in the recipient
country. Furthermore, in this study I find that more aid is given to poorer
countries, while the amount of aid given to poor countries decreases with the
size of the population. This analysis also finds that corruption increases with
income. The possibility that corruption increases with the recipient’s GDP per
capita is consistent with other authors’ findings such as that of Braun and Di
Tella (2004). Finally, including fixed effects in the model confirms that, in
addition to the independent variables identified in the model, the likelihood of
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high corruption is significantly influenced by the unique characteristics of each
country. Similarly, the unique characteristics of each country also significantly
affect the amount of total foreign aid received.
Policy Recommendations
It is interesting that in the model refinements in Chapters V and VI,
corruption does not affect total aid decisions, and it does not affect bilateral or
multilateral aid decisions. Donors do not consider the extent of existing
corruption when making aid decisions; corrupt countries are not penalized in
aid decisions. The incorporation of such penalties into aid decisions may
provide an effective incentive to recipient countries to fight corruption. It
should however be noted that sub-Saharan African countries should not wait
for outside solutions to fight corruption; this fight must start with the
government itself, otherwise the solution is not sustainable. Donors can help in
this fight by creating incentives through aid requirements. In this way subSaharan governments will be more likely to engage in effective internal reform
efforts.
Analogous to the “conditionality effect” discussed in the first model, in
which donors’ condition aid on reform efforts, donors should also condition aid
on democratization. Democracy is seen to increase GDP per capita, and so
should be included in the toolbox of development strategies in sub-Saharan
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Africa. By incorporating democratization requirements for aid recipients,
donors can improve their effectiveness in increasing GDP per capita.
Also, it is important to note that bilateral aid is effective at reducing
corruption, while multilateral aid is not. This may result from differences in
corruption reform requirements on aid recipients for these two types of aid.
Future analysis should consider the differences in reform requirements for
bilateral and multilateral aid; multilateral aid should be designed to be
effective in fighting corruption. It should be noted that, overall, bilateral aid
appears to works at increasing GDP per capita through reducing corruption
and encouraging democracy. It should also be noted that, although, the result
in Chapter V appears to suggest that multilateral aid negatively affects GDP
per capita, overall, multilateral aid may affect GDP per capita positively
through other means other than through reducing corruption or encouraging
democracy as it is the case with bilateral aid.
Another important finding of this dissertation is that deficits are
negatively related to GDP per capita in the recipient country. Therefore, subSaharan African countries must find a way to reduce government budget
deficits. When budget deficits increase, national savings decrease, which leads
to a decrease in private investment. In other words, a large budget deficit will
increase the interest rate, thereby reducing private investment. This lower
investment will lead to lower productivity, which will reduce future income.
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One possible solution is to reduce taxes for private investors, thus encouraging
private investment; such investment is made possible by reduced government
spending. However, reductions in taxes may increase deficits and reduced
government spending may reduce GDP in short term.
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APPENDIX A
COUNTRIES IN BASE SAMPLE FOR CORRUPTION AND AID
REGRESSION
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Countries in base sample for corruption and aid regression
Angola
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
Congo.Dem.Rep(Zaire)
Congo Republic
Cote d Ivoire
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Kenya
Liberia
Madagascar

Malawi
Mali
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
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The donor’s maximization problem can be written as:
WD = E[(1 − r (Ω))h (α (σ ) | σ ] + E[(1 − r (Ω))h (α (σ ) | σ ]
subject to

Maximize

α (σ ), α (σ )

α (σ ) ≤ B, σ ∈ { σ , σ }
v (α (σ )) [q(e)-zq(e) + z-zq(e)] + v(α (σ ))[zq(e) + (1 − z )(1 − q( e ))] ≥ δ
[2z q(e ) -2zq(e) - q(e) + q(e)][v (α (σ )) − v(α (σ ))] ≥ δ

A. Assume that only the IR-constraint binds:
L = E[(1-r(Ω))h( α ( σ ) ] + E[1-r(Ω)h( α ( σ ) ] +
λ[−δ + v(α (σ ) [q(e) - zq(e) + z - zq(e)] + v(α (σ )[zq(e) + (1 − z ) * (1 − q(e ))]

∂L
= 1-r(Ω)h’( α ( σ ) ) + λ (v’( α ( σ ) ) * [1-q( e ) -z + 2zq( e ) ] = 0
∂α (σ )
∂L
= 1-r(Ω)h’( α ( σ ) ) + λ (v’( α ( σ ) )*[q( e ) + z-2zq( e ) ] = 0
∂α (σ )
∂L
= [−δ + v(α (σ ) [q(e) - zq(e) + z - zq(e)] + v(α (σ )[zq(e) + (1 − z ) * (1 − q(e ))] =0
∂λ

Since the donor drives strictly positive marginal utility of aid, the result is:

α (σ ) = B = α (σ )
This implies that B dollar is provided no matter what the signal.

109

IR
IC

B. Assume that IC-constraint binds
L = E[(1-r(Ω))h( α ( σ ) ] + E[(1-r(Ω))h( α ( σ ) ] +
[2z-1](q( e )-q( e) )[v( α ( σ ) ) – v( α ( σ ) )] ≥ δ
L = E[(1-r(Ω))h(B)] + E[1-r(Ω)h( α ( σ ) ] +
λ[−δ +[2z-1](q( e )-q( e) )[v(B) – v( α ( σ ) )] = 0
L = E[(1-r(Ω))h(B)] + E[1-r(Ω)h( α ( σ ) ] +
λ [− δ + [v(α (σ )2zq( e) − v(α (σ )2 zq ((e) − v(α (σ ) q(e ) + v(α (σ )) q(e) − v(α (σ )2 zq (e ) +
v(α (σ )) 2 zq (e) + v(α (σ ))q (e )] − v(α (σ )) q (e)]] = 0
L = E[(1-r(Ω))h(B)] + E[1-r(Ω)h( α ( σ ) ] +
λ [− δ + [v(B)2zq(e) − v(t )2 zq ((e) − v( B) q (e ) + v( B)) q (e) − v(α (σ )2 zq (e ) +
v(α (σ ))2 zq (e) + v(α (σ )) q (e )] − v(α (σ ))q (e)]] = 0
∂L
= h’(B)*(1-r(Ω)) – v’(B)[2zq( e ) -2zq( e) -q( e ) + q( e) ] λ = 0
∂B

∂L
= h’( α ( σ ) *(1-r(Ω)) – v’( α ( σ ) )[2z q( e ) +2zq( e) + q( e ) –q( e) ] λ = 0
∂α (σ )
∂L
= − δ + v(B)[2zq( e ) -2zq( e) -q( e ) + q( e) ]– v( α ( σ ) )[2z q( e ) +2zq( e) + q( e ) –
∂λ
q( e) ]=0

v( α ( σ ) =

− δ + v(B)[2zq(e) - 2zq(e) - q(e) + q(e)]
[2z q(e ) - 2zq(e) - q(e) + q(e)]

v( α ( σ ) = v( B) − δ
Let [v( B) − δ

[2z q(e ) − 2zq(e) − q(e) + q(e)]

[2z q(e ) − 2zq(e) − q(e) + q(e)]]

=θ

⇒ α (σ ) = v (θ )
-1
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APPENDIX C
MAP OF AFRICA
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Africa map courtesy of Graphic Maps: Downloaded from worldatlas.com on
6/13/08.
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APPENDIX D
INTERPRETING THE COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES
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Interpreting the Coefficient Estimates

There are three types of variables in my equations: logged variables,
continuous non-log variables, and dummy variables. I estimate the following
equation:

ln G = β 0 + β x ln x + β y y + β z z
In this equation x is a logged variable (such as LBIL and LPOP), y is a
continuous variable (such as COR, DEM, and ETHT), and z is a dummy
variable (such as SURPNEG1).

(1) β x , the coefficient of a logged variable:
This coefficient is interpreted as an elasticity.

(2) β y , the coefficient of a continuous variable:
To interpret β y , note that

G=e

β 0 + β x ln x + β y y + β z z

= e β 0 e β x ln x e
= e β0 x β x e

βy y

βy y

e βzz

e βz z

Since y is continuous,
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dG
β y
= β y e β0 x β x e y e β z z = β y G
dy
⎛ dG ⎞
⎜⎜
⎟⎟
dy
⎠=β
⇒⎝
y
G

β y is the percent change in G for a one-unit change in y. Thus, a one-unit
change in y is associated with a β y *100 % change in G.
Example: If β y = 0.5 , then a one unit change in y will increase G by
50%.

(3) β z , the coefficient of a dummy variable:
If the dummy variable equals zero, such as is the case for observations of
countries running a surplus, then
G0 = e β 0 x β x e

βy y

When the dummy variable equals one, then
G1 = e β 0 x β x e

βy y

e β z z = e β z G0

Thus,

G1 = e β z ⋅ G0

β z give the impact of the dummy variable on G relative to the reference group;
the reference group consists of observations of countries running a surplus in
this analysis.
Example: If β z = 0.5 , then e 0.5 = 1.65 .
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⇒ G1 is 165% of G0
In this example, the dummy variable results in a 65% increase from the
expected value of G for the reference group.
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APPENDIX E
FIRST STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS
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Table 10
First Stage Regression Results Examining the Simultaneity Between Total
Foreign Aid and Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa
Coefficient
Intercept
DEM
LGDPC
LPOP
OP
ETHT
SURPNEG1
SURPNEG2
SURPNEG3
SURPNEG4
SURPNEG5
INF
ARMS
LTDEBT

Dependent Variable
LTAID
COR
0.746078
1.925844**
(0.761748)
(1.134894)
0.065017*
-0.05168
(0.021519)
(0.032061)
-0.21382*
-0.10094
(0.043354)
(0.064588)
0.147996*
-0.09965
(0.048528)
(0.072299)
-0.00447*
-0.00419**
(0.001053)
(0.001569)
-0.02556
0.128397*
(0.0277896)
(0.041553)
-0.14847
-0.14260
(0.108350)
(0.161426)
0.386576*
-0.41879*
(0.099168)
(0.147746)
0.531995*
-0.66733*
(0.102370)
(0.152516)
0.672256*
-0.48412*
(0.100759)
(0.150116)
0.555618*
-0.56508*
(0.098158)
(0.146241)
-0.00003
0.000082*
(0.000026)
(0.000038)
0.080613
-0.16237**
(0.063771)
(0.095010)
0.171618*
0.189609*
(0.044658)
(0.066534)
R2 =0.51955, F = 42.76
R2 =0.18199, F = 8.80

(standard errors in parenthesis)
*Statistically significant at the 95% level
** Statistically significant at the 90% level.
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Table 11
First Stage Regression Results Examining the Simultaneity Between Bilateral
Aid and Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa
Coefficient
Intercept
DEM
LGDPC
LPOP
OP
ETHT
SURPNEG1
SURPNEG2
SURPNEG3
SURPNEG4
SURPNEG5
INF
ARMS
LTDEBT

Dependent Variable
LBIL
COR
-0.09675
1.925844
(0.890024)
(1.134894)
0.078907*
-0.05168
(0.025143)
(0.032061)
-0.10642*
-0.10094
(0.050653)
(0.064588)
0.101393**
-0.09965
(0.056699)
(0.072299)
-0.00525*
-0.00419**
(0.001230)
(0.001566)
0.008090
0.128397*
(0.032588)
(0.041553)
-0.19136
-0.14260
(0.126596)
(0.161426)
0.440143*
-0.41879*
(0.115867)
(0.147746)
0.611015*
-0.66733*
(0.119609)
(0.152516)
0.813150*
-0.48412*
(0.117727)
(0.150116)
0.697452*
-0.56508*
(0.114688)
(0.146241)
-0.00005
0.000082*
(0.000030)
(0.000038)
0.082136
-0.16237**
(0.074510)
(0.095010)
0.185260*
0.189609*
(0.052179)
(0.066534)
R2 =0.43984, F = 31.05
R2 =0.18199, F =8.80

(standard errors in parenthesis)
*Statistically significant at the 95% level
** Statistically significant at the 90% level.
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Table 12
First Stage Regression Results Examining the Simultaneity Between
Multilateral Aid and Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa
Coefficient
Intercept
DEM
LGDPC
LPOP
OP
ETHT
SURPNEG1
SURPNEG2
SURPNEG3
SURPNEG4
SURPNEG5
INF
ARMS
LTDEBT

Dependent Variable
LMUL
COR
801273
1.925844**
(1.123921)
(1.134894)
0.095837*
-0.05168
(0.031835)
(0.032061)
-0.55123*
-0.10094
(0.064135)
(0.064588)
0.3226261*
-0.09965
(0.071791)
(0.072299)
-0.00139
-0.00419*
(0.001558)
(0.001569)
-0.08667*
0.128397*
(0.041261)
(0.041553)
0.00481
-0.14260
(0.160292)
(0.161426)
0.296814*
-0.41879*
(0.146708)
(0.147746)
0.472871*
-0.66733*
(0.151444)
(0.152516)
0.388009*
-0.48412*
(0.149062)
(0.150116)
0.313109*
-0.56508*
(0.145214)
(0.146241)
-0.00001
0.000082*
(0.000038)
(0.000038)
0.076922
-0.16237**
(0.094343)
(0.095010)
0.074673
0.189609*
(0.066067)
(0.066534)
R2 =0.44574, F =31.80
R2 =0.18199, F = 8.80

(standard errors in parenthesis)
*Statistically significant at the 95% level
** Statistically significant at the 90% level.
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Table 13
First Stage Regression Results Examining the Simultaneity Between Total
Foreign Aid, Corruption, and per capita GDP in Africa
Coefficient
Intercept
DEM
LPOP
OP
ETHT
SURPNEG1
SURPNEG2
SURPNEG3
SURPNEG4
SURPNEG5
INF
ARMS
LTDEBT
ILLITERACY

LTAID
0.748514
(0.787623)
0.058118*
(0.023989)
0.096725**
(0.051820)
-0.00881*
(0.001494)
-0.01872
(0.032326)
0.156391**
(0.129739)
0.492592*
(0.106680)
0.689869*
(0.116500)
0.909340*
(0.110980)
0.631508*
(0.113272)
0.000806
(0.001084)
0.042317
(0.069605)
0.149732*
(0.0458352)
0.0066151*
(0.001681)
R2=0.48818
F=25.75

Dependent Variable
COR
-0.30209
(1.140658)
-0.06385**
(0.034741)
0.215699*
(0.075048)
0.001216
(0.002164)
0.183371*
(0.046815)
0.094672
(0.187892)
-0.17831
(0.154498)
-0.38111*
(0.168719)
-0.24167
(0.160725)
-0.51091*
(0.164044)
0.002670**
(0.001570)
-0.35527*
(0.100804)
0.00644
(0.066379)
0.002867
(0.002434)
R2=0.19949
F=6.73

(standard errors in parenthesis)

*Statistically significant at the 95% level
** Statistically significant at the 90% level
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LGDPC
9.830753*
(0.0.624273)
0.149226*
(0.019014)
-0.57895*
(0.041073)
-0.00335*
(0.001184)
-0.02382
(0.025622)
-0.38507*
(0.102832)
-0.51500*
(0.084555)
-0.54746*
(0.092339)
-0.67567*
(0.087963)
0.25149*
(0.089780)
-0.00548*
(0.000859)
0.188343**
(0.055169)
0.299770*
(0.036329)
-0.01951*
(0.001332)
R2=0.69379
F=61.17

Table 14
First Stage Regression Results Examining the Simultaneity Between Bilateral
Aid, Corruption, and per capita GDP in Africa
Coefficient
Intercept
DEM
LPOP
OP
ETHT
SURPNEG1
SURPNEG2
SURPNEG3
SURPNEG4
SURPNEG5
INF
ARMS
LTDEBT
ILLITERACY

LBIL
1.749603*
(0.815210)
0.080374*
(0.024829)
-0.10737*
(0.053635)
-0.01159*
(0.001547)
-0.01612
(0.033458)
0.110937
(0.134283)
0.443843*
(0.110417)
0.679254*
(0.120581)
0.915675*
(0.114868)
0.742653*
(0.117240)
-0.00188**
(0.001122)
0.050103
(0.072043)
0.244229*
(0.047440)
0.003759*
(0.001739)
R2=0.45516
F=22.56

Dependent Variable
COR
-0.30209
(1.140658)
-0.06385**
(0.034741)
0.215699*
(0.075048)
0.001216
(0.002164)
0.183371*
(0.046815)
0.094672
(0.187892)
-0.17831
(0.154498)
-0.38111*
(0.168719)
-0.24167
(0.160725)
-0.51091*
(0.164044)
0.002670**
(0.001570)
-0.35527*
(0.100804)
0.00644
(0.066379)
0.002867
(0.002434)
R2=0.19949
F=6.73

(standard errors in parenthesis)

*Statistically significant at the 95% level
** Statistically significant at the 90% level
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LGDPC
9.830753*
(0.624273)
0.149226*
(0.019014)
-0.57895*
(0.041073)
-0.00335*
(0.001184)
-0.02382
(0.025622)
-0.38507*
(0.102832)
-0.51500*
(0.084555)
-0.54746*
(0.092339)
-0.67567*
(0.087963)
0.25149*
(0.089780)
-0.00548*
(0.000859)
0.188343*
(0.055169)
0.299770*
(0.036329)
-0.01951*
(0.001332)
R2=0.69379
F=61.17

Table 15
First Stage Regression Results Examining the Simultaneity Between
Multilateral Aid, Corruption, and per capita GDP in Africa
Coefficient
Intercept
DEM
LPOP
OP
ETHT
SURPNEG1
SURPNEG2
SURPNEG3
SURPNEG4
SURPNEG5
INF
ARMS
LTDEBT
ILLITERACY

LMUL
-3.58096*
(1.184063)
0.076127*
(0.036063)
0.529312*
(0.077904)
-0.00389*
(0.002247)
-0.01979
(0.048597)
0.353844**
(0.187837)
0.615665*
(0.160377)
0.839233*
(0.175139)
1.013485*
(0.166841)
0.353932
(0.170286)
0.004550*
(0.001630)
0.074786
(0.104640)
-0.06376
(0.068905)
0.013375*
(0.002526)
R2=0.41766
F=19.36

Dependent Variable
COR
-0.30209
(1.140658)
-0.06385**
(0.034741)
0.215699*
(0.075048)
0.001216
(0.002164)
0.183371*
(0.046815)
0.094672
(0.187892)
-0.17831
(0.154498)
-0.38111*
(0.168719)
-0.24167
(0.160725)
-0.51091*
(0.164044)
0.002670**
(0.001570)
-0.35527*
(0.100804)
0.00644
(0.066379)
0.002867
(0.002434)
R2=0.19949
F=6.73

(standard errors in parenthesis)

*Statistically significant at the 95% level
** Statistically significant at the 90% level
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LGDPC
9.830753*
(0.624273)
0.149226*
(0.019014)
-0.557895*
(0.041073)
-0.00335*
(0.001184)
-0.02382
(0.025622)
-0.38507*
(0.102832)
-0.51500*
(0.084555)
-0.54746*
(0.092339)
-0.67567*
(0.087963)
0.25149*
(0.089780)
-0.00548*
(0.000859)
0.188343*
(0.055169)
0.299770*
(0.036329)
-0.01951*
(0.001332)
R2=0.69379
F=61.17

Table 16
First Stage Regression Results Examining the Simultaneity Between Total
Foreign Aid and Corruption Using Fixed Effects Approach
Coefficient
Intercept
DEM
LGDPC
LPOP
OP
ETHT
SURPNEG1
SURPNEG2
SURPNEG3
SURPNEG4
SURPNEG5
INF
ARMS
LTDEBT

Dependent Variable
LTAID
COR
0.746078
1.925844*
(0.761748)
(1.134894)
0.065017*
-0.05168
(0.021519)
(0.032061)
-0.21382*
-0.10094
(0.043352)
(0.064588)
0.147996*
-0.09965
(0.048528)
(0.072299)
-0.00447*
-0.00419*
(0.001053)
(0.001569)
-0.02556
0.128397*
(0.027891)
(0.041553)
-0.14847
-0.14260
(0.108350)
(0.161426)
-0.386576*
-0.41879*
(0.099168)
(0.147746)
-0.531995*
-0.66733*
(0.102370)
(0.152516)
0.672256*
-0.48412*
(0.100759)
(0.150116)
0.555618*
-0.56508*
(0.098158)
(0.146241)
-0.00003
0.000082*
(0.000026)
(0.000038)
0.080613
-0.16237**
(0.063771)
(0.095010)
0.171618*
0.189609*
(0.044658)
(0.066534)
R2 =0.51365, F = 41.76
R2 =0.18199, F = 8.80

(standard errors in parenthesis)
*Statistically significant at the 95% level
** Statistically significant at the 90% level.
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